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
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


INFLUENCE
OF THE
BRETON DEPUTATION AND THE BRETON CLUB
IN THE
FRENCH REVOLUTION
(APRIL-OCTOBER, 1789)

A DISSERTATION PRESENTED TO SECTION I OF THE
PHILOSOPHICAL FACULTY OF THE UNIVERSITY
OF ZÜRICH FOR THE DEGREE OF
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

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INTRODUCTION

Contemporaries and later historians agree in ascribing to Bretagne an extraordinary rôle in the Revolution, but they have never even attempted to give us an exact and complete account of what this rôle was or how it was performed. Barthélemy Pocquet has in an excellent work, *Les Origines de la Révolution en Bretagne*, led the way to a correct understanding of it. His two volumes are, however, concerned with the local revolution only. But in reading them we seem in the midst of a French Revolution in miniature, so far as its opening period is concerned. There are the same parties with the same attitudes, the same fundamental problems, the same ideas sustained with even greater violence. When, on June 7, 1789, the deputy Le Roulx wrote: "I imagine even that if you will recall the propositions of conciliation which were made to your six deputies at the Court relative to the affairs of Bretagne, you will find between their conduct and that which we should hold an evident analogy,"¹ it was not a mere fancy

¹Two days before, June 5, he wrote: "Nous avons actuellement assemblée tous les soirs à la chambre provinciale. Divers membres des autres provinces s'y rendent, vue la position dans laquelle nous nous trouvons et qui n'est cependant pas autre que celle dans laquelle la Bretagne s'est trouvée avec la noblesse et le clergé." Kerviler *Recherches et Notices*, art. *Le Roulx*.

on his part, but the expression of a fact, the clear conception of the similarity of conditions of which his colleagues were certainly not unaware—perhaps, even, they were consciously imitating at Versailles a course which their order had already, in form, although not definitely, completed in their province.

That the deputies coming from a province which had just undergone such a revolution would bring with them advanced views generally will be inferred without argument, but to show more exactly what their personal experience had been and what their sentiments were when they entered the States General, I have written chapter I, which, however, does not pretend to be more than the most essential outline. This chapter furnishes, so to speak, the means of understanding the second.

In chapter II, I have attempted to give an account of the motions introduced or sustained by the Breton deputies as a body or by their club, always in close connection with the incidents of the moment and the fundamental motives which were evidently influential. The object here was to trace the influence of this nucleus in the assembly and the manner in which it was exercised. For this purpose, even had the evidence permitted, it was not necessary to give a separate account of the Breton Club and of the organization composed exclusively of the deputies of Bretagne.

Admittedly the evidence is not abundant. Much is left obscure or not conclusively proved, yet, upon the essential points enough light is thrown to show by what system the group of deputies in question was consistently guided; to show that in the most fundamental questions they were the ones who pressed the principles of the Revolution to their ultimate consequences, and that in the crises of the early period it was from them that the cry of rally, of resistance to the forces of the old order of things went out.

But their extraordinary influence was due to their unity, to their hatred of the privileged orders, to their experience in previous conflicts with them. When the Revolution, largely through their efforts, stood triumphant, when the 4th of August decrees had legally swept away the remains of the feudal system and positive legislation began, they no longer possessed their former advantage over their co-deputies. They may still have been more radical or more violent in the expression of their views, but they were little more experienced in the problems which now faced them. The causes which had united them had now weakened or disappeared, their counsels become divided, and with the October revolution their great rôle seems fully ended.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

In *Der Jakobiner-Klub*, written in 1852, J. W. Zinkeisen devotes a chapter to the Breton Club. Speaking of the light in which its enemies later represented this organization he says: "Likewise it certainly remained aloof from the acts of violence which already in the first months of its existence gave to the Revolution the threatening character of a general uprising of the people. But admittedly, too, in later times when only too often passion was forced to direct the blood-dipped pen of history, many charges of this kind were laid to its account, because it was regarded as the cradle and forerunner of Jacobinism, whose fatal influence it was sought to discover everywhere."¹ How true this observation is even the meagre evidence we possess to-day abundantly shows. But this knowledge brings us only slightly nearer to historical truth, for no one with even the most elementary idea of the early period of the Revolution would give serious consideration to the accounts of the "blood-dipped pen" as

¹I, p. 86.

exemplified in the history of the Revolution by Montjoie. When we have brushed aside such material as nearly or totally worthless in the establishment of fact, there remains the principal task of reconstructing the positive picture. An entirely different class of evidence exists in the records left by former members of the club or by those temporarily in contact with it and, at the time, not hostile to it—records full of errors and colored, not by passion, but by time and subsequent events. It is upon this perplexing material, very general in character and small in volume, that Zinkeisen has based the chapter in which he does indeed succeed in clearing away the myths with which the enemies of the Revolution had enshrouded the club, but in which he is also led into many errors and false conjectures, due to the nature of the evidence out of which, it must be said, he attempted to make too much.¹ Nor does

¹No sufficient purpose would be served to criticise Zinkeisen's work in detail. Its unsatisfactory character is best felt if, after reading his chapter, we ask ourselves what definite facts, concerning the work of the club, we have learned. Some of his errors may, however, be pointed out briefly. In vol. I, p. 60, he says that the Breton Club was founded at the suggestion of Mirabeau, as if Le Chapelier and the deputies of Bretagne had been strangers to the idea of clubs! I have shown in chap. I, sec. II, that the Breton organization at Versailles was the natural outgrowth of the events in Bretagne, and in chap. II, sec. I, how the so-called Breton Club naturally grew out of the smaller Breton Committee. On p. 85 of the same volume, he argues from facts to motives, and as a result places the whole Breton deputation in a wrong light. "Als . . . zur Zeit der Verhandlungen über das Veto, Chapelier und seine Freunde vom Club Breton die Städte der Bretagne aufgehetzt hatten, und diese, namentlich Rennes und zwei andere, Deputationen mit Adressen an die National-Versammlung schickten," etc. Compare this with the evidence from the correspondence of the Breton deputies presented in chap. II, sec. VII. On p. 72, he states that the Breton Club controlled the elections in the assembly. On the other hand, we know that, if they had a special candidate in the election on the 3d of August, he was defeated when Thouret was elected. *Bulletin de Brest* I, No. 34. Nor is it certain that Le Chapelier was the formal candidate of the club. See note 1, p. 77, below. It is, moreover, certain that in the election at the close of August they were defeated, for they considered Langres and several of the secretaries as belonging to the "cabal" which they most bitterly opposed. *Bulletin de Rennes*, II, No. 3. Letter of Hardy de la Largère, *Archives d'Ille et Vilaine*, L. 294. See also pp. 57-60, below, and note 1, p. 58.

much of a definite and positive nature result from his work after it is stripped of its conjectures. From this material, then, little is to be learned. In 1889, Professor F. A. Aulard, in his *La Société des Jacobins*, published all the evidence, as he then believed, which contemporaries had left us concerning the Breton Club, but admitted that it was contradictory and unsatisfactory. He concluded: "What historians posterior to the Revolution have added to these details does not seem to rest upon anything serious."¹

Aulard, however, who treated the Breton Club only as an introduction to his collection of sources on the Jacobin Club, did not make use of the correspondence of the Breton deputies. But it is precisely in this correspondence that nearly the whole of our reliable evidence is found. Of this correspondence, seven collections, either in the original or in copy, have at present been recovered, namely, those of the deputations of Rennes, Nantes, Brest, Saint-Brieuc, and of the deputies Delaville Le Roulx, Boullé, and Pellerin, representing in all twenty-one deputies. To this must be added the correspondence of the Clergy of Rennes, included in the bulletin published at Rennes. Unfortunately for our purpose, the writers as a rule confine themselves to the general affairs of the assembly. It is by way of exception that the Breton Committee and the Breton Club are mentioned, and even then we are often not informed what action they took. In this way, we are frequently forced to recur to the individual opinions as expressed in the debates and correspondence of the different deputies, in order to learn what the position of the deputation and those allied with it was. For this purpose, the original letters of Legendre and Moyot, the copies of those of Le Roulx, and the reprints of the originals of Cham-

¹I, p. XVI.

peaux-Palasné and Poulain de Corbion, and of Boullé are especially valuable because these writers express their opinions, impressions, hopes, and fears without the reserve characterizing the printed correspondence of Rennes and Brest and the letters of Pellerin. That such a method must be used with caution is evident. In favor of it is to be urged the fact that the Breton deputies were characterized by their contemporaries as exceptional for their unity of views and action. When, therefore, we find the same sentiments persistently recurring in the correspondence of a number of the deputies, without meeting with contradictions, we have a very strong presumption that this is the reflection of a general attitude rather than the expression of mere personal views. By means of this evidence and the motions made or sustained in the assembly, we are enabled to reconstruct the consistent course followed by the deputation and the club from the opening of the States General to the discussion over the veto.

It is important to know that this correspondence, if not in every case technically, was in effect official in character. A number of municipalities and *sénéchaussées* in April and May, 1789, established "bureaus of correspondence" by which to keep themselves in touch with the work of their deputies and that of the States General.¹ An example of the manner in which this correspondence was conducted is found in the regulations adopted at Brest and preserved in the city library of that place under the title: *Résultat des conventions pour l'établissement de la correspondance de Brest avec MM. les députés de la sénéchaussée aux Etats Généraux, et de la ville avec les*

¹ Besides Brest, these were Rennes, Nantes, Saint-Brieuc, Guérande, and Lorient, so far as I have been able to discover from definite records, but that there was correspondence besides this is shown by the collection of letters of Boullé and isolated letters of the deputies of Quimper and of Corroller du Moustoir.

campagnes en conformité du vœu verbalement exprimé, à l'issue de l'assemblée générale de ladite sénéchaussée par les députés-électeurs qui la composaient, le 8 avril 1789. This is dated May 17, 1789, and signed by the "Députés-Electeurs" and "Officiers-Municipaux." The regulations are long and formal, intended to guard closely against deception. Following are the most important articles: Art. 2. "The primary object of this correspondence shall be the most prompt and exact communication from Brest, of all the news directly delivered by the deputies to the States General; this communication to be made by means of copies of the different documents collated and guaranteed by the commissioners of Brest." Art. 3. "The bureau of Brest shall be charged directly with the correspondence, as well with that of the deputies to the States General as with that of the four correspondents of the country districts before designated." Art. 4. "It shall follow the prescribed plan and keep an exact register of its daily operations." Art. 5. "It shall preserve, with order and exactness, the letters and other documents which shall be addressed to it, both those of the deputies to the States General, and those of the country correspondents and private individuals." Art. 6. "This bureau shall be established at the *Hôtel de Ville* and shall be composed of seven commissioners who shall replace each other as follows." Then follow the regulations in detail. The bureau was to form a deliberative body, making its decisions by majority vote, this majority then signing the correspondence. The packages addressed to the bureau were removed from the post-office by a secretary and opened only in the presence of the commissioners and a municipal officer.¹

¹*Recueil* No. 2, 334. Compare with the arrangement made by the *sénéchaussées* of Nantes and Guérande. *Archives Nationales*, C21, dos. 111. Also art. III of the additional articles of the *sénéchaussée* of Rennes. *Archives Nationales*, B²⁶, liasse 170^{bis}.

As a result of this arrangement, we have to-day the original letters of Legendre and Moyot (No. 1 below), the inexact copies of them made by the above named bureau, and a printed bulletin (No. 2 below) based upon this correspondence, and also upon other sources of information, as is shown by the contents of the bulletins. But of the correspondence of the bureau with the country districts and of any letters of private individuals which may have been received by the bureau, no trace has been found. At Rennes a similar bureau was established, but, unfortunately, of this most important deputation we have neither the original letters nor the copies made of them by the bureau. We are confined to a printed bulletin "avowed" by the bureau, in which, if the example of the bureau at Brest was followed, the most intimate opinions of the deputies were suppressed.

In the National Library at Paris are preserved the above-named bulletins of Rennes and Brest, besides many pamphlets, resolutions, *procès-verbaux* of meetings, including some of the electoral assemblies and a number of the *cahiers* of 1789. In the *Procès-verbaux* of the electoral assemblies and the *cahiers* now in the National Archives, aside from the formal mandates, considerable information is found relative to the rôle of the deputies in the province and the spirit which ruled in the electoral assemblies of which they were in nearly every case members.

Following is a classified list of the principal documents and works consulted.

I. STRICTLY CONTEMPORANEOUS EVIDENCE.

1. *Correspondance de Legendre et Moyot, députés à l'assemblée des Etats Généraux et à l'Assemblée nationale.* Composed of the original letters of Legendre and Moyot in the archives of Brest, containing 395 letters beginning April 28, 1789, and ending December 30, 1791.

Extracts have been published by MM. Delourmel and Corre in *La Révolution française*, Dec.-Jan., 1900-1901. In the body of their letters, the deputies usually confine themselves to the plain narrative of the debates and proceedings of the assembly to which is sometimes added news from Paris or Versailles. It is in their postscripts, evidently not intended for publication, that the affairs concerning the Breton deputies especially are discussed.

2. *Etats Généraux. Bulletin de la correspondance de la députation du tiers état de la sénéchaussée de Brest.* . . . 3 vols. Brest Imprimerie de R. Mallasis, 1789-1790. *Bib. Nat.* Lc2/129.

These bulletins commenced May 12, 1789, according to the copy in the National Library, and ended January 1, 1791. On the relation existing between these bulletins and the original letters (No. 1 above) Delourmel and Corre write: "The letters are in effect altered, both in the bulletin and upon the copying register where they were transcribed in the form in which they were to be printed. It happens even that certain events are described under the signature of Legendre, with many details borrowed from the papers of Versailles and Paris."¹

3. *Etats Généraux. Correspondance de Bretagne. Bulletin des correspondance réunies du clergé et de la sénéchaussée de Rennes.* . . . 5 vols. Rennes, Vater fils, 1789-1790. *Bib. Nat.* Lc2/130.

This was a publication similar to the bulletin of Brest, issued three times a week. In the number of May 13, 1789, occurs the following announcement: "Le Bulletin des Etats Généraux, avoué par le bureau de la Correspondance établie à Rennes et signé de M. l'Abbé Colet, membre du dit Bureau" etc., which would seem to indicate that the letters published were reproduced exactly from the

¹*La Révolution française*, December, 1900.

copies furnished by the bureau. The issues for the month of September, 1789, are wanting in the copy in the National Library. These may be found in the city library of Rennes.

4. *Feuille hebdomadaire pour la Bretagne. Affiche de Rennes.* 2 vols. 1784-1792. City library of Rennes, 49E, 15. This is a very incomplete copy of a newspaper which, among other things, also published extracts from the correspondence of the deputies of Rennes.

5. *Correspondance de MM. les députés des communes d'Anjou, avec leurs commettans, relativement aux Etats Généraux à Versailles en 1789-1790.* 10 vols. Bib. Nat. Lc2/145. Contains valuable evidence on the earlier sessions of the Third Estate in the detailed accounts given by the deputies in their regular and systematic letters.

6. *Correspondance des députés des Côtes-du-Nord aux Etats Généraux et à l'Assemblée nationale constituante. Publiée par M. D. Tempier. Première partie Avril-Octobre 1789.* Published in the *Société d'emulation des Côtes-du-Nord*, vol. 26. The original letters of Champeaux-Palasse and Poulain de Corbion.

7. *Correspondance inédite de J. M. Pellerin, député du tiers état de la sénéchaussée de Guérande aux Etats Généraux, (5 mai 1789-29 mai 1790) recueillie et annotée par Gustave Bord.* Paris, 1883. This is the official correspondence of Pellerin addressed to the bureau and municipality of Croisic.¹

8. Correspondence of Jean-Pierre Boullé, published in the *Revue de la Révolution publiée sous la direction de*

¹Pellerin was, also, for some time the writer of the letters published in the *Bulletin des Etats-Généraux, par les membres du bureau de correspondance de Nantes*, now in the city library of Nantes, but which I have not been able to consult. On June 12, 1789, he wrote: "C'est occuper les intervalles de ces séances et le matin qu'il me faut rédiger . . . votre correspondance et celle de Nantes, dont je me suis pareillement chargé."

Gustave Bord. vols. 11-13. Paris, Bertaux-Bray, Editeur. Boullé was deputy from Pontivy. The original letters are now in the archives of the Department of Morbihan.

9. *Correspondance de M. de la Ville Le Roulx du 3 avril 1789 au 21 août suivant*, composed of the copies of the letters of Le Roulx made by the bureau of correspondence to which they were addressed, and now in the municipal archives of Lorient. This correspondence was also printed by the bureau, but no printed copy is now known to exist.¹

10. *Lettre adressée à messieurs les citoyens de la Ville de Rennes, par M. le Chapelier, député de la sénéchaussée de Rennes.* . . . Versailles, ce 12 Septembre 1789. 12 pages. Rennes chez N. Audran. *Bib. Nat.* Lb39/7816.

11. *Relation des événements du 6 mai au 15 juillet 1789*, composed of the letters of an anonymous correspondent now in the *Archives des affaires étrangères*, and published by Armand Brette in *La Révolution française*. vols. 23-24.

12. *Journal D'Adrien Duquesnoy, député du tiers état de Bar-le-Duc, sur l'Assemblée constituante. 3 mai 1789-3 avril 1790. Publié par la société d'histoire contemporaine, par Robert de Crèvecœur.* 2 vols. Paris, 1894.²

13. *Hérault de la nation, sous les auspices de la patrie (par Mangourrit).* Jan. 1 to June 30, 1789. *Bib. Nat.* Lc2/102.

¹May 11, 1789, the bureau at Lorient wrote to Rennes: "Le bulletin que nous tirons des lettres de nos députés et que nous faisons imprimer." That this was continued is shown by a letter of Le Roulx of December 30, 1789. "Vous avez pris le parti de faire imprimer mes lettres." See the register of this correspondence at Lorient, BB12-13.

²See the criticism of this journal by Armand Brette in the *Revue Critique*, May 11, 1896, and the reply of Guilhaumez in the same review, June 22, 1896. See also the *American Historical Review*, October, 1902, in which Fling has shown from a study of the bulletins that Duquesnoy must have been the author.

14. *Journal d'état et du citoyen, par Mademoiselle de Keralio, de l'académie d'Arras et de la société patriotique bretonne*, published at Paris from Aug. 13 to Nov. 30, 1789, according to the numbers preserved in the National Library. *Bib. Nat.* Lc2/214.

15. *Le Point du jour, ou résultat de ce qui s'est passé la veille à l'Assemblée nationale.* 26 vols. Paris, 1789-1791.

16. *Récit des séances des députés des communes depuis le 5 mai 1789 jusqu'au 12 juin suivant.* Paris, 1895.

17. *Procès-verbal de l'assemblée des communes et de l'Assemblée nationale.* 75 vols. Paris, 1789-1791.

18. *Courrier de Provence.* 18 vols. Paris, 1789-1791.

II. MÉMOIRES AND OTHER WORKS OF CONTEMPORARIES.

1. Beaulieu, C. F. *Essais historiques sur les causes et effets de la Révolution de France.* 6 vols. Paris, 1801-1803.

2. Montjoye. *Histoire de la Révolution de France et de l'Assemblée nationale.* Paris, 1792.

3. Moleville, Bertrand de. *Histoire de la Révolution de France.* 14 vols. Paris, 1801.

4. Grégoire. *Mémoires de.* Par M. H. Coruet. 2 vols. Paris, 1867.

5. Lameth, Alexandre. *Histoire de l'Assemblée constituante.* 2 vols. Paris, 1828.

6. *Mémoires sur la Révolution française; extraits de la correspondance de Condorcet et de celle de ces amis. Par Frédéric-Gaeton de la Rochefoucauld-Liancourt.* 2 vols. Paris, 1824.

7. Dubois-Crancé. *Analyse de la Révolution française des Etats Généraux jusqu'au 6 brumaire an IV de la république.* Paris, 1885.

8. Ferrières, Marquis de. *Mémoires sur les assem-*

blées parlementaires de la Révolution. 2 vols. Paris, 1821.

9. Droz, Joseph. *Histoire du règne de Louis XVI.* 2 vols. Paris, 1839.

10. Duchatellier, A. *Histoire de la Révolution dans les départements de l'ancienne Bretagne.* . . . 6 vols. Paris et Nantes, 1836.¹

11. *Vie privé et politique du roi Isaac Chapelier.* Rennes, 1790. Bib. Nat. Lb39/3100. A pamphlet of 112 pages violently attacking Le Chapelier, Mirabeau, and the Breton deputies.

III. THE WORKS OF LATER HISTORIANS.

1. Aulard, F. A. *Etudes et leçons sur la Révolution française. Première série.* Paris, 1893.

2. Aulard, F. A. *La Société des Jacobins. Recueil de documents pour l'histoire du Club des Jacobins de Paris.* 6 vols. Paris, 1889.

3. Kerviler, René. *Recherches et notices sur les députés de la Bretagne aux Etats Généraux et à l'Assemblée nationale constituante de 1789.* 2 vols. Rennes, 1889.² By the same writer, *Armorique et Bretagne.* . . . 3 vols. Paris, 1893.

¹Duchatellier is given here because he was in position to obtain information from men who lived through and participated in the events he narrates.

²Kerviler's work is valuable for our purpose principally for the large amount of detail it contains concerning the individual deputies of Bretagne, and for the numerous extracts from their correspondence. The author has made but little attempt to interpret the work of the deputation as a whole. He writes from a conservative point of view with a tendency to permit his feelings to interfere with his appreciation of the strength of historical motives, so important in his subject. This seems to have prevented him from understanding the most important member of the deputation, namely, Le Chapelier. It must be admitted that Le Chapelier sometimes expressed himself in very vigorous language, but it seems to have escaped Kerviler altogether that he was repulsed by the violence of the July revolution—that if he did indeed approve of it, it was only because he saw in it

4. Chérest, Aimé. *La chute de l'ancien régime*. 3 vols. Paris, 1887-1889.

5. Le Téo. *Le Club Breton et les origines du Club des Jacobins*. In *La Révolution française*, vol. 36.

6. Zinkeisen, J. W. *Der Jakobiner-Klub. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der Parteien*. 2 vols. Berlin, 1852.

the only possible way to liberty—and that from that time on he began to withdraw more and more from the increasing violence of the party, which was still unsatisfied with the work already done. See below, chap. II, pp. 77, 83-84, and Kerviler, art. *Le Chapelier*, and his concluding generalizations.

CHAPTER I

THE BRETON DEPUTIES AND THE REVOLUTION IN BRETAGNE

(1788-1789)

I

THE DEPUTIES AS LEADERS IN THIS REVOLUTION

In Bretagne, several causes existed to hasten the Revolution and to make it at first more violent than elsewhere in France. The abuses of the Ancient Régime were greater here than in any other province, while at the same time the people were the more dissatisfied because they had for years agitated for reforms. Long before the opening of the Revolution, the Third Estate had fought in the provincial assembly for increased rights and the removal of some of the most oppressive burdens, only to be met by a resistance that it was unable to overcome.¹

In the parliamentary agitation of 1787 to 1788, the long struggle was momentarily suspended in order to present a firmer resistance to what was believed an encroachment of the general government upon the rights of Bretagne reserved in the "Contract of Union," fixing the conditions under which the province was united to the crown of

¹Duchatellier, *Histoire de la Révolution dans les départements de l'ancienne Bretagne*, I, 3-4. "Il y eut en Bretagne, longtemps avant la collision de 89 entre la Noblesse et le tiers, une lutte vive, animée, qui durait près d'un siècle, quant, en janvier 1789, la Noblesse bretonne se retrancha aux Cordeliers de Rennes, poussant ses laquais au combat . . . Mais combien de fois déjà, les mêmes idées et les mêmes classes d'hommes ne s'étaient-elles pas mesurées dans la salle des Etats et sur la place publique?"

France.¹ But the Third Estate was not deceived as to the real meaning of the conflict between the government and the parliament sustained by the local nobility. When Louis XVI. was compelled to abandon his reform program and announce the assembly of the States General, it attacked its former allies with surprising vigor and unity in agitating for its own rights as an order.

Foremost in this movement of the Third Estate were those who were later to be elected deputies to the States General. The signal of revolution was given by Cottin as the instigator of resolutions adopted by Nantes on November 6.² "The Third Estate demands that the deputies of this city to the coming estates of the province be expressly charged to ask that, from the present session, the deputies of the Third Estate shall always be equal in number to those of the Clergy and Nobility combined, and that to this effect the Nobility shall no longer participate in the estates except by its deputies, the number of which is to be determined by the three orders. . . . The Third Estate demands that its deputies shall not enter the assembly until the two first orders have deliberated over and consented to its just demands, and (which is not to be anticipated) that in case of refusal they shall give immediate notice, in order that the Third Estate may ask aid of the sovereign, sole chief of all justice."

These resolutions were presented to the king by twelve envoys, among whom were the future deputies Cottin, Jarry, Duplessis, Chaillon, and Blin. Many municipalities followed the example of Nantes in adopting the same or similar resolutions which they presented to the govern-

¹Chérest, *La chute de l'ancien régime*, I and II, *passim*, and Pocquet, *Les origines de la Révolution en Bretagne*, I.

²These resolutions, *Placets adressés au Roi et à la Reine*, are found in the National Library at Paris, Lb39/66. Kerviler, *Recherches et notices*, art. *Cottin*, says they were the work of Cottin.

ment either directly or through the representatives of their order already at Paris.¹ The importance of this movement was at once realized by the privileged orders, but their attempt to influence the ministers to cause the king to refuse to receive the envoys, and thus discredit the idea to which their reception might give rise, failed.² At Paris the envoys formed themselves into a single body for the discussion, not only of the immediate business for which the different members had been sent, but of the whole political movement of the time. At first, they sent daily bulletins to Nantes in the name of the "Twelve deputies of the Third Estate at Court,"³ but on December 18 they either assumed, or were given the title, "The deputies of the Third Estate of the province of Bretagne, at the Court."⁴ On November 18 they wrote: "Deputies from the different cities of our province come to us here, and we receive daily from other cities the adhesions which they hasten to address to us."⁵ On December 19, they announced: "The deputies of Lorraine and of Franche-Comté join us to present to the ministers a mémoire which will destroy the false insinuations contained in the one drawn up in the name of several provinces, insinuations

¹Pocquet, II, chap. 2. A large mass of these resolutions, together with the pamphlets of the same period and of a period a little later, exist in the National Library and in the municipal and departmental archives of Bretagne.

²Charles Robert, *Urbain de Hercé*, etc. Paris. Victor Retaux. Hercé was at Versailles at this time and charged by the Nobility to confer with the ministers to prevent the reception of the envoys of Nantes. See the correspondence of the first half of November.

³Bulletin No. 3. Four of these bulletins, Nos. 3, 8, 13, and 14, are preserved in the departmental archives at Saint-Brieuc in printed form, all but No. 3 dated from Paris. No. 3 is dated November 14, No. 14, December 19. They were printed and distributed by the municipality of Nantes to justify the course of its deputies at the court, as is explained by a letter of expedition accompanying them, dated from Nantes, December 25, 1788.

⁴No. 13.

⁵No. 8.

which the public has promptly judged as they ought to be. It regards with pleasure the princes who have not signed this *mémoire*.”¹ This mission proved a veritable political school for those who were charged with it, for while they came into contact with the men leading in the agitation in other parts of France, they were at the same time observing the work of the Assembly of Notables, the position of the parliament, and learning of the hearty manner in which Paris approved of the radical action Bretagne was taking at the moment.² Of this they were themselves quite conscious, for just before the opening of the estates of the province they sent, in the name of “The deputies of the Third Estate of Bretagne at the Court,” a list of the demands they thought the order should adopt, as a whole, justifying this presumptuous step by saying, “You ought to do us the justice to think that this proposition is inspired by the special knowledge we should possess of the means to be employed, and which are indicated to us by enlightened and well-intentioned men.”³

Just how long this sort of revolutionary committee remained at Paris, or the exact number of those who at one time or another formed part of it, it is impossible to determine. After the estates of the province opened, the Third Estate as a whole sent deputies to represent its interests at the court. Of the future deputies to the States General, besides the five from Nantes already mentioned, Kervélégan, Le Déan, Le Roulx, Le Chapelier, La Chapelle, Coupard, Boullé, and Champeaux-Palasse were thus sent upon one errand or another.⁴ It is more than

¹No. 14.

²Ibid.

³See the pamphlet, *Charges à donner à MM. les députés du Tiers à la prochaine assemblée des états*. Bib. Nat. Lk2/528.

⁴Kerviler, *Recherches et notices*. See the names in question.

probable, too, that Le Chapelier, Varin, Lanjuinais, and Glezen, who were sent in February by the *avocats* of Rennes, joined the same body.¹ Of the importance of their work, Kerviler goes so far as to say that the impulse to the revolutionary movement in Bretagne came from this committee at Paris.²

Owing to the position of their city as capital of the province, the future deputies of Rennes became more intimately concerned with the revolutionary movement even than those of Nantes. Even before the provincial estates opened at the close of December, the privileged orders had resolved to refuse the demands of the Third Estate.³ Rennes, where an unusually large number of partisans of both parties had gathered,⁴ increased daily in excitement, until on the 26th and 27th of January it became the scene of a violent conflict in arms, in which a number on both sides were killed or wounded. This incident and the incriminations following it influenced profoundly the entire future course of the Third Estate of Bretagne. It fixed in the minds of its members the conviction that the Nobility had contemplated the massacre of its leaders, and created in it a hatred of the whole aristocracy, which its deputies carried with them to the States General, becoming with some of their colleagues in the assembly their distinctive mark.⁵ Even before this, a vague feeling had existed that the issue might be reduced to a question of arms. A league which had long existed between the young men of Rennes, Nantes, Saint-Malo, and Angers had been extended to many other cities of Bretagne, all

¹ See p. 21.

² Art. *Defermon des Chapelières*.

³ Pocquet, II, 90-92, 144-145.

⁴ *Ibid.*, II, chap. IV.

⁵ See pp. 51, 52, below.

united by a "compact of union" and to a large extent armed.¹ When, on the 26th of January, the young men at Rennes who were accustomed to gather at the *Café d'Union* were attacked by the valets, they hurriedly sent messengers to the "jeunes gens" of several other cities asking for aid.² Nantes and Saint-Malo responded so promptly that their contingents arrived near Rennes before new messengers could inform them that the rapid settlement of the difficulty rendered their services no longer necessary.³

This armed demonstration made a deep impression upon the two privileged orders. There could be no doubt of the close alliance of the leaders of the Third Estate and this armed body throughout the province. At the law school at Rennes where the avocats were the most violent supporters of the Third Estate, a club had been organized

¹*Relations des événements qui se sont passés en Bretagne, rédigées par les députés du Clergé et de la Noblesse. Bib. Nat. Lb39/6900.* "Une ligue qui existait long-temps avant le 27 janvier entre les jeunes gens de Rennes, de Saint-Malo, de Nantes et d'Angers, s'est étendue dans toutes les villes de la province; les associés portent un ruban où l'on voit un emblème du Tiers, et pour devise, *vaincre ou mourir*; ils ont conservé les fusils enlevés du magasin du Roi; ils ont osé traiter avec le commandant de la province; ils ont des drapeaux où sont peintes les armes de la Bretagne et celle de M. de Thiard; ils vont par troupes et armés dans les différentes villes, ils y font des enrôlements, la vie de quelques gentilshommes est menacée." These bodies of young men were the forerunners of the National Guards, but they seemed to have been without any legal control or status whatsoever. Their action, when not entirely spontaneous, was taken upon the advice of private individuals, and thus served as a powerful instrument in the hands of the leaders of the Third Estate. In the departmental archives at Saint-Brieuc (C. 165) exist two different plans or constitutions for the union of the different units, the title of one of which, "Pacte social entre les jeunes citoyens de Bretagne et provinces voisines, et autorisés par leurs pères," is instructive. Concerning their spirit and manner of action, see *Arrêté de l'assemblée générale des jeunes citoyens et étudiants en droits, de la ville de Rennes*, etc. 2 mars, 1789. *Bib. Nat. Lb39/7008*. Another deliberation by the same body, Feb. 27. *Bib. Nat. Lb39/7060*. Also *Protestation et arrêté des jeunes gens de Nantes, du 28 janvier 1789. Bib. Nat. Lb39/6932*. Pocquet, II, chaps. VI and VII.

²Pocquet, II, chap. VII.

³*Ibid.*

where many of the students and young men met to discuss the political questions of the day.¹ At the *Café d'Union* a similar club existed.² This whole group of men they now attacked in a *mémoire* drawn up in the name of the Clergy and Nobility. In this it was charged that a body of men existed who, in order to further their sinister designs, had persuaded the "jeunes gens" that the Nobility had armed its valets for the attack on the 26th of January. It was claimed, too, that this organization of young men, manipulated by the leaders of the agitation, could have no other design than to attack the Nobility.

This attack of the Clergy and Nobility, almost official in form, while denouncing the whole movement of the Third Estate, was especially dangerous for the *avocats* at Rennes in that it gave their enemy, the Parliament, an occasion for beginning a systematic prosecution, not only of themselves, but of the whole body of young men who had now become recognized as the final support of the Third Estate. The leaders and their armed supporters were thus to be struck down together. The *avocats* at once saw the danger and drew up a reply in which they made a vigorous defense of the "jeunes gens" and declared the Parliament of Rennes a body unfit to sit in judgment over the affairs of the 26th and 27th of January, because it was at the same time party and judge, it being notorious that its interests were entirely with the Nobility.³ What part the future deputies of Rennes had in this episode may be judged from the fact that Glezen, Lanjuinais, Le Chapelier, and Varin were appointed to present this *mémoire* to the king.⁴

¹Pocquet, II, 232 ff.

²Note 1, p. 20, above.

³Pocquet, II, pp. 296 ff. Also *Discours adressé à Monseigneur le Garde-des-Sceaux*, le 6 février 1789, etc. *Bib. Nat.* Lb39/6969.

⁴*Ibid.*

Lanjuinais, avocat and professor of law at the law school of Rennes, had long been known for his liberal views. Ten years before the opening of the Revolution he had been violently attacked for an opinion he had published in favor of the Third Estate relative to the *droit de colombier*. As a result of this, he had been practically forced to abandon his profession owing to the dislike conceived against him by the members of the Parliament of Rennes.¹ When in 1788 Le Guer published the circular letter in which the Nobility announced rudely its opposition to reforms, Lanjuinais promptly replied by a crushing analysis of the letter, article by article. After exposing the fallacy of Le Guer's argument in maintaining that the interests of each order were sufficiently guarded by the veto of each, he struck at the heart of the controversy in frankly announcing the necessity of a fundamental or constitutional change. Le Guer had said "That all innovation, in opening the door to the arbitrary, will tend only to bring about trouble and anarchy."² With the greatest indignation and irony Lanjuinais replied: "Negroes! you have been reduced almost to the condition of brutes; no innovation. Russian peasants! you are slaves; no innovation. Children of the kings of Asia! according to custom the strongest and wildest among you strangles his brethren; no innovation. Jagas of Africa! among you exist the slaughter houses of human flesh; no innovation. People of Bretagne! you suffer greatly, but the nobles are people very well off; no innovation. You have the veto to exercise in your favor, in an assembly of seven to eight hundred nobles, by forty and some deputies from the cities, of which several are nobles or aspiring to be."³

¹ *Œuvres de J. D. Lanjuinais*, Paris, 1832. I, 6.

² *Ibid.*, I, 116.

³ *Ibid.*, I, 116.

This pamphlet was soon followed by another, "*Le pré-servatif contre l'avis à mes compatriots*," in which, after summing up the grievances of the Third Estate, he defended the king and Necker against the attacks of the Nobility of Bretagne, maintaining that their intention was to liberate France by giving it a constitution. "Gratitude and enthusiasm for the sovereign are the only sentiments which should manifest themselves and be forever fixed in the hearts of all."¹

Glezen also entered the conflict through the press in a "*Lettre d'un homme à 864 nobles bretons*," in which he asked why the people of Bretagne were so anxious to change their constitution, if it were the base of their happiness as the Nobility maintained. "How dare you to affirm in the eighteenth century that a constitution in which the dignity of man is debased and his rights disowned so far as to subject millions of men to the caprices and cupidity of a privileged class, that a constitution in which a small number of individuals, establishing themselves as despots, have arrogated to themselves the odious privilege of exemption from the public contributions and to force the people to support the entire burden, that precious portion of the nation which, they say ironically, has been always dear to them; that a constitution, finally, which is essentially inconsistent with the public welfare, since in order to achieve it (the public welfare) reforms would be necessary, but which would never be accomplished while those who pretend to be masters, the guardians of that constitution, crush by their preponderance the well-intentioned citizens; . . . how do you dare to say that such a constitution procures the happiness of a great province and that every Breton ought to cling to it as firmly as to his honor? What then are your ideas of honor that they

¹Ibid., 134, 135.

should be placed upon the same level with those of pecuniary exemptions? For, finally, you did indeed wish to disguise your motive; it is to these shameful exemptions that you are so tenderly attached; it is in them that you find your happiness."¹

Glezen and Defermon, likewise closely identified with the agitation in the province,² and secretary of the provincial estates,³ were members of the intermediary commission and as such charged with the important correspondence of the deputies of the Third Estate at the court.⁴ With Le Chapelier, Glezen had been on the committee of four charged with drawing up the *cahiers* of the Third Estate of Rennes, adopted on November 24.⁵ Glezen was himself elected deputy to the Estates after their suspension in January.⁶ In the extraordinary assembly of deputies at Rennes, which drew up, in effect, the final *cahiers* of the order, the future deputies, Le Chapelier, Defermon, Cottin, Chaillon, Duplessis, Jary, Baco, Bougerel, Coupard, Le Déan, and Boullé were present.⁷

In other cities of Bretagne, the relation of the future deputies to the Nobility and the reform movement was very similar. At Vitré, Hardy de le Largère had difficulties with the parliament and was very bitter against the Nobility.⁸ Kervélégan and Le Déan at Quimper were the first to oppose the parliament in the fall of 1788.⁹

¹Kerviler, *Recherches et notices*, art. Glezen.

²Ibid. Arts. Glezen and Chapelières.

³Ibid.

⁴Ibid.

⁵*Extraits des registres du greffe de l'hôtel de ville de Rennes. Bib. Nat. Lb39/697.*

⁶Kerviler, art. Glezen.

⁷*Résultats des délibérations tenues en l'hôtel-de-ville de Rennes, les 22, 24, 25, 26, et 27 décembre 1788, etc. Bib. Nat. Lb39/1887 A.*

⁸Manuscript letter of Largère, *Archives d'Ille et Vilaine*, L. 294.

⁹Chérest, *La chute de l'ancien régime*, II, 333, 334. Also *Lettre de M. De Goazre de Kervélégan à M. Ballais, etc. Bib. Nat. Lb39/6628*, a printed pamphlet of 47 pages.

Kerangal of the *sénéchaussée* of Lesneven, while very active himself, had made his house the rendezvous of the local reform committee and the militia organized in support of the Third Estate.¹ Nearly all the deputies were men of considerable experience in public affairs. Seven at least had been mayors of cities, six had held the office of senechal, five that of procureur. Nine had been deputies to the provincial assembly (principally to the last one) and eight had been appointed on the intermediary commission, February 14, 1789.² Fifteen were *avocats* who as a body had been active in political agitations since the middle of the century, or even earlier.³ In the elections in April, they were again very prominent. A majority were delegates to the electoral assemblies in which ten of them were chosen on the committees on *cahiers*, namely, Boullé, Bourgerel, Chaillon, Corbion, Duplessis, Legendre, Lanjuinais, Morhery, Pellerin, and Thégadout.⁴ Kerviler states that the important *cahiers* of Rennes were almost entirely the work of Lanjuinais.⁵

II

EFFECT OF THE PROVINCIAL REVOLUTION UPON THE ATTITUDE AND FUTURE ACTION OF THE DEPUTIES

The effect upon the Breton deputies of the events above narrated was profound. Contemporaries usually ascribe their unity in the States General to the effect of their club.

¹Kerviler, art. *Kerangal*.

²These facts were in large part gathered from the work of Kerviler. The rest were found in the resolutions, *procès-verbaux*, and *cahiers* of the period, which it is not possible to cite in detail.

³See Rocquain, *L'esprit révolutionnaire avant le Révolution. Passim*.

⁴The *procès-verbaux* of the electoral assemblies preserved in the *Archives Nationales*.

⁵Kerviler, art. *Lanjuinais*.

The real relation of historical forces would be more correctly represented by saying that their club was an evidence and a result of their unity. Both their committee and their club were undoubted factors in their power in the assembly, but the fundamental causes of their unity lie deeper. They must be sought for in Bretagne rather than at Versailles. What reasons can be assigned to explain why their mere artificial organization should have been any more lasting or effective than similar organizations formed by the deputies from other provinces?¹ They were the representatives of a province whose century-long struggles in defense of its independent life had given its people, far from possessing the French character even to-day, a strong sense of a separate nationality,² a feeling just reawakened by the parliamentary opposition of 1787-1788. It is not uncommon to find in the local literature of 1788-1789, the people of Bretagne called the "Breton Nation."³ Many of the *cahiers* demanded the preservation of the special régime until that time in force, and it is a significant fact that one of the first things undertaken by the deputies upon their arrival at Ver-

¹As, for instance, the deputation of Languedoc. Léon Pignaud, *Un agent secret sous la Révolution et l'Empire, Le Comte d'Antraigues* p. 70. Zinkelsen, I, 59: "Fast jede Provinz fand sich in abgesonderten Vereinen zusammen, welche jedoch meistens nur gesellschaftliche Berührungspunkte ohne bestimmte politische Zwecke sein sollten."

²Pocquet, *Les origines de la Révolution en Bretagne, I, Intro.* pp. XIX-XX. "Malgré cela (the centralizing work of the Revolution) qu'on le pardonne au patriotisme d'un Breton,—on peut dire que la Bretagne existe encore. Nul pays n'a gardé plus profondément empreintes les traces de son ancienne unité, plus vivants les souvenirs de cette vie provinciale qui fit tant de fois battre le coeur de ses enfants. Mieux encore peut-être que la Provence, elle a conservé dans le démembrement des choses sa personnalité; car elle aussi a eut sa langue, sa poésie, ses mœurs, sa nationalité."

³See the *procès-verbal* of the election at Quimper, April 18. *Archives Nationales*, BA26, liasse 169bis. *Extrait du procès-verbal des séances de la sénéchaussée de Quimper des 16, 17, . . . 23 avril, 1789.* The address of the inhabitants of the country. *Bib. Nat.* Le23/161.

sailles was to attempt to form a common *cahier*, as if the province were to be represented as a whole and not by *sénéchaussées*. They arrived at the States General with an experience and from a political atmosphere entirely different from that of their colleagues. They had been the leaders in a struggle which had thoroughly unified and crystallized opinion. In Bretagne, the time for hesitation on the part of the Third Estate had long passed. Revolution had been boldly declared and all hopes of compromise with the privileged orders abandoned. As Du-bois-Crancé writes: "It is, so to speak, from the center (*foyer*) of its insurrection that the people (those of Bretagne) had drawn the elements which were to cause their rights to prevail and to manifest their will in the great assembly of the representatives of the nation."¹ The deputies of Bretagne wished to repeat at Versailles the tactics which had in their province led to success so far as events had as yet shown—they were prepared to *summon* the privileged orders before arguing with them. It was this which gave decision and definiteness to their speeches and propositions in the States General, and it was an element of their Breton character, called *franchise* by themselves, which caused them to state without circumlocution what their opinions were. Finally, their position was like that of an army which had burned its bridges behind it—to retreat meant destruction. Unless the radical course they had begun was definitely carried through, the Nobility of their province threatened to take fearful vengeance for the events at the close of 1788 and the beginning of 1789.² Their momentary safety was due to the

¹ Extract in Aulard. *La Société des Jacobins*, I, p. XII.

² Chérest, *La chute de l'ancien régime*, II, 376. "Jusqu'à la dernière minute, l'aristocratie bretonne resta sur la brèche, harcelant le tiers état de poursuites sans repit, et semblant prendre à tâche de soulever contre elle des rancunes inoubliables."

paralysis of the old organization and the arms of the "jeunes gens."

As to the formation of their committee at Versailles, it was probably contemplated by many of them before they left the province. The dangers to which they were exposed in common, the personal acquaintanceship of the majority of them,¹ together with the example of a similar committee of which a number had been members six months before, the clubs at Rennes during the session of the last estates, would alone have suggested it. But the organization was made necessary, in effect, by the formal instructions of several deputations to consult with their co-deputies relative to their *cahiers* and the events connected with the rioting of the 26th and 27th of January. At Saint-Brieuc instructions were given, "To unite with their co-deputies of Bretagne, to communicate to each other their *cahiers*, and concert together the means to be employed to secure the general welfare and the welfare of this province in particular."² At Quimper the deputies were to "require their co-deputies of the province to unite with them and to extend that union even to the deputies of the other provinces of the kingdom in order to cause to be repressed the audacity of a tribunal which dares to condemn the *mémoire* which His Majesty has well received, and to blame at once both the confidence of the subjects and the grace of the monarch."³ Rennes and

¹Le Téo in *La Révolution française*, vol. 36, p. 387, says: "Tous ces hommes se connaissaient personnellement, avaient intérêt à réserver leurs relations dans une assemblée provinciale des députés de Bretagne." This statement must not be taken literally. It is not probable that they had all met to become personally acquainted—at least there is no evidence to prove it. On the contrary we find the deputies of Saint-Brieuc writing: "Car nous avons beaucoup d'aristocrates ici, même quelques uns parmi les députés de Bretagne," which would seem to show distrust of some of their colleagues, which could not have been the case had they known them personally.

²Art. I of the *cahiers*.

³*Procès-verbal* of elections. *Archives Nationales* B26, liasse 169 bis.

Ploërmel gave instructions to cause an investigation of the January riots in order to fix the responsibility, and also relative to the act of the Parliament of Paris in ordering the *mémoire* of the *avocats* of Rennes to be burned, without definitely charging their deputies to consult their colleagues.¹

¹*Procès-verbal*, April 16, of elections at Rennes. *Archives Nationales* B¹ 26, *liasse* 170 bis. *Cahiers* of Ploërmel, arts. 92 and 93. *Ibid.*, 160 bis.

CHAPTER II

THE BRETON DEPUTIES AND THE BRETON CLUB IN THE
STATES GENERAL AND THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY.

I

ORGANIZATION AND ORIENTATION

Thus, toward the close of April, under the vivid impressions of the confusion and dangers through which they had passed in their province, carrying with them the passions, still glowing, engendered by an exceptionally bitter strife, and in fear and distrust of the whole aristocratic body, the deputies of Bretagne arrived at Versailles, men tried in a common cause. Here they lost no time in procuring the means of regular communication with each other, for before all the deputies had arrived and while they were still disquieted over the absence of Kervélégan,¹ of Quimper, they engaged a hall where on the 28th of April they assembled for the first time.² As the States

¹That they feared actual violence at the hands of the Nobility is shown by a letter of the deputies of Saint-Brieuc dated April 28, in which they say: "M. le sénéchal de Quimper n'est pas encore arrivé et cela nous inquiète, car nous avons beaucoup d'aristocrates ici."

²The correspondence of the deputies does not agree as to the date of the first meeting. Le Roulx states that the first meeting was held on the 30th of April (letter of April 30). Boullé gives the same date, but since in the original letter of Legendre of April 28 mention of a meeting is already made, it must be that Le Roulx and Boullé refer to the first meeting *at which they were present*.

The hall in which they met at first was not satisfactory, for on April 28 Legendre wrote: "J'ai élevé des cris contre le choix de lieu de nos assemblées qui ne pouvait convenir par cela même que la salle ne devoit rien coûter, et j'ai été nommé commissaire avec M. de Fermond pour louer une autre grande salle." (Mss. Arch. of Brest). But we are not informed whether a change was actually made. On April 30, Le Roulx wrote that they met in a "corps de logis." According to a letter of Legendre on May 1, it was in "une salle très vaste." The statements of contemporaries and the voice of tradition agree in

General did not open until the 5th, they had before them a week which they employed in orientating themselves politically, in discussing the affairs of their deputation, their *cahiers*, and the question of the manner of voting. They had already learned of the attack¹ made upon the validity of their credentials by the Nobility and the Clergy at Saint-Brieuc, and in their very first meeting they considered the manner of their defense. The question was whether or not they should publish a reply at once or postpone their defense until their credentials should come before the States General. The latter course was decided upon.² For the next meeting, they determined to occupy themselves with the clauses in their *cahiers* demanding that all taxes voted by the States General should be subject to approval by the estates of Bretagne so far as they applied to that province, an important demand which was later to cause them considerable embarrassment.³ It had been their intention to begin at once the coordination of the demands made in all the *cahiers* of the province, including those of the *curés*, but it soon appeared to them preferable to consider first of all the great fundamental questions which confronted the States General as a whole—the union of the orders and the manner of voting.⁴ On April 30, the deputies of Franche-Comté, Normandy, Dauphiné, Guyenne, and Périgord were present at their meeting. Mounier, who was soon to become one of their strongest opponents, and who in 1792 laid many fatal acts

indicating the building in which the club met, as situated in the *Avenue de Saint-Cloud* and the *rue de la Pompe* (No. 44 in 1889) and the hall upon the ground floor as the one used by the club. See Aulard, *La Société des Jacobins*, I, pp. 3, 4.

¹Declaration of the Clergy and the Nobility. *Bib. Nat.* Le23/170.

²MS. letter of Legendre and Moyot, April 28. *Archives de Brest*.

³Ibid. This was considered as an imperative mandate. See note 2, p. 67, below.

⁴Legendre and Moyot, May 1.

to their account,¹ was now held in high esteem at the club. Following his conciliatory inclinations, he attempted in this meeting to begin a movement for the purpose of causing an understanding between the three orders by means of extra-legal meetings in which the questions, foreseen to fall under discussion as soon as the States General opened, might be debated. With this object in view, he asked that for the next day a "comité général" of all the deputies of the three orders be called in a large hall. This was agreed upon, but Legendre assures us that the majority did not favor the project, nor could he see that any good would result from such a "cohue," it having been consented to out of condescendence to the "Orator of the Dauphine," who had just won over several *curés* for the vote by head in the preliminary question of deciding how the vote should be taken.² Nothing indicates whether or not this meeting ever took place.

It is not evident that the deputies of Bretagne from the first contemplated the holding of two parallel series of meetings. Their primary object had been to provide a means of union among themselves for the two-fold purpose of discussing the affairs of their province and deputation, and for the preparation for the debates in the assembly. But it is evident that in gatherings where the deputies of whole provinces appeared, these objects could no longer be served. Accordingly, Le Roulx writes on April 30 that it had been decided to hold, aside from the original assembly, another daily, open to all the deputies who desired to attend.³ This latter assembly was the so-called *Breton Club*.

¹ *Recherches sur les causes qui ont empêché les Français de devenir libres.*

² Legendre and Moyot, May 1.

³ "Outre cette assemblée particulière, il y aura une autre quotidienne pour tous députés qui voudront s'y rendre." MS. letter in *Archives de Lorient*.

Details regarding the internal organization of the club are entirely wanting. We know nothing of the manner in which its meetings were organized or controlled. They seem to have had a president to preside over the debates,¹ which, however, probably seldom assumed a formal character, for Barnave early in 1790 describes them as "conversations."² The Breton deputies never designated it by the name "club," nor is it so named in any strictly contemporaneous document, as far as I have been able to learn. The term occurs first in Mounier's *Exposé de ma conduite*, late in 1789, after the club had ceased to exist. Even here, it is not called the "Breton Club," but spoken of as composed of a group of deputies who were accustomed to "unite in a club." In the correspondence of the deputies, it is never in name distinguished from the smaller assembly composed exclusively of the deputies of Bretagne. "Comité de Bretagne," "Chambre de Bretagne," "Chambre de la Province," or "Assemblée de la Province," are terms applied to both, and it is sometimes difficult or impossible to determine which of the two is intended. It is certainly clear that, to the minds of the Breton deputies, the club never lost its character as an organization strictly in their hands. Without a fixed program of meetings, its workings and existence continued to depend upon the will of the Breton deputies in whose hall it assembled and who determined when it should come together. These depu-

¹Dubois-Crancé, *Analyse de la Révolution française*, p. 49, says: "Lanjuinais présidait cette réunion." Both Buchez et Roux in *Histoire parlementaire de la Révolution*, II, 36, and Droz, *Histoire du règne de Louis XVI.*, II, 169, mention the Duke d'Aiguillon as having been president. Aulard, *Intro.* The Breton committee was later formally organized into committees and corresponded as a body, Legendre being president of it in February, 1790. See the *Bulletin de Brest* for Nov.-Mar., 1789-1790. In No. 16, vol. I, is a letter by Legendre, written as president of the organization.

²Aulard, *La Société des Jacobins*, I, *Intro.* XXVIII. *Règlement de la Société des Amis de la Constitution.*

ties formed the necessary nucleus which, as occasion seemed to demand, threw open its hall to the deputies of the other provinces. That the club did not possess an independent and permanent organization is evident from the manner in which Le Roulx and Boullé spoke of it. The former wrote on September 18: "Such a revolution has taken place as to strike the deputies of Bretagne. Their hall is *again* open to all deputies whomsoever, and they hope by this conduct, which is the same as that which they held before and after the 17th of June, to save the country from a cabal, alas, too evident." On December 18, Boullé wrote: "You will remember that in principle the deputation of Bretagne formed at Versailles a *comité particulier*" (i. e., a committee composed of deputies of Bretagne. It is the same term used by Le Roulx, on April 30, to distinguish the original assembly of the Breton deputies from the larger one which had just been formed for all the deputies) to which joined themselves *under difficult circumstances* all the friends of liberty. . . . The title, *Comité de Bretagne*, has just been changed to *Société de la Révolution*, which is to take a *regular form* by means of statutes which are being prepared."¹ Evidently, then, the club had for some time preceding the 18th of September suspended its meetings. It was only "under difficult circumstances" that "all the friends of liberty" joined themselves to the *Comité particulier*, and it was only in December that this *Comité de Bretagne* was to be given a "regular form."

What contemporaries later called the "Breton Club" thus appears from the strictly contemporaneous records left by those most intimately connected with it, as composed of merely an irregular series of meetings attended

¹Kerviler, *Recherches et notices*, art. Boullé.

by a very variable number of deputies and in evidence especially during periods of crises. From the extracts above quoted, it will be seen that the membership was but little, if at all, controlled. It was a place of meeting for "all those who desired to attend."¹ To speak, then, of a list of members is to show a misconception of the nature of the club,² for the "membership" varied from meeting to meeting. This does not, however, preclude the idea that a certain number of deputies were regular in their attendance, and thus, in effect, formed a somewhat permanent membership. This conception of the club disposes, without argument, of all charges that it, as an organization, intrigued in secret or engaged in criminal plots of one kind or another.³

According to the different *mémoires* of contemporaries, many prominent members of the assembly attended the meetings of the club, among them Sieyès, Mirabeau,⁴ Bar-

¹See note 3, p. 32, above. That there was no formal condition of membership is to be inferred, also, from the letter of an anonymous correspondent, dated July 9, 1789. "Il faut remarquer," he writes, "que les députés de Bretagne ont admis dans leur assemblée beaucoup d'autres députés de différentes provinces et qu'ils reçoivent tous ceux qui veulent y assister." *La Révolution française, July-December, 1892*.

Dubois-Crancé writes: "Alors, le Club breton devint celui de tous les députés reconnus pour être les défenseurs de la cause du peuple. On présume bien qu'il s'y introduisit quelques faux frères, des émissaires de la cour; mais comme nous ne faisons rien que ce que nous eussions fait, sans scrupule, en place publique, nous attachions peu d'importance à cet espionnage." Extract in Aulard, I, p. XII.

²See the extract from Buchez et Roux, in Aulard, I, p. XVII.

³See extracts from Montjole in Aulard, I, pp. IX-XI.

⁴Montjole includes Mirabeau among the leaders of the club. In a pamphlet of 1790, *Vie privée et politique du roi Isaac Chapelier*, he is represented as controlling, with Le Chapelier, the Breton Club and the Breton committee. But I have not been able to find any trace of any connection between Mirabeau and the Breton deputies founded upon reliable evidence. On the contrary, he seems to have at first been held in horror by them. On May 8, Legendre and Moyot wrote: "Ce forcené (Mirabeau) livré à la fureur de son penchant pour la satire, ne connaît aucun règle, aucune mesure, ne respecte aucune vérité, déchire, attise, et défigure tout le résultat des faits et cir-

nave, Bailly,¹ Pétion, Volney, Grégoire, Robespierre, Bouche, Charles and Alexandre Lameth, La Révellière-Lépeaux, Dubois-Crancé, the Marquis de Lacoste, and the Duke d'Aiguillon.² Regarding the number who were usually present, we have but very little evidence. Boullé wrote on June 10th that the evening before "all the better citizens from all the provinces were assembled there."³ Droz says⁴ that on the evening preceding the *Jeu de Paume* episode the Duke d'Aiguillon presided over a meeting of about 150, while the 22d of June, according to Grégoire, only 12 to 15 were present.⁵ An anonymous

constances dont il embrasse le détail." This outburst was occasioned by the manner in which Mirabeau had expressed himself in his journal, for which several of the deputies of Bretagne had subscribed. On June 2, they complain of the *Gazette de Leyde* "qui nous a calomnieusement rayé sous la bannière et dans la phalanx de M. le Comte de Mirabeau." Le Roulx, in a letter of May 15, expresses similar sentiments.

Professor Alfred Stern has kindly called my attention to an anonymous work he discovered in the city library of Zürich, *Luzifer oder gereinigte Beiträge zur Geschichte der französischen Revolution. Erster Theil. 1797*. In this work occurs the following passage: "Mirabeau suchte ihn auf (Le Chapellier, when he arrived at Versailles as deputy of the States General), denn Chapellier hatte sich durch seine freiheitseifernde Schritte mehr als ein Verhaftungsdekret auf den Hals geladen, und also bekannt genug gemacht um des Aufsuchens werth zu sein. Man frug sich, man sondirte sich. Was ist Eure Absicht? Was verlangt Ihr? Freiheit der Personen und des Eigenthums, so weit sich dieselben treiben lassen, war Chapellier's Antwort. Gut! das wollen wir auch, sagte Mirabeau." As a result of this, Le Chapellier, it is said, was introduced to Adrien Du Port (and presumably also to the *Comité Du Port*) and thus led into the intrigues of Mirabeau and others to make political capital out of the position and wealth of the Duke of Orleans. Pp. 112-114. For this anonymous work see the *Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft*, 1890, in which Stern shows that Konrad Engelbert Oelsner was the author. Also *Revue historique*, 1897, January-April, p. 72 ff, where a translation with an introductory note, by Stern, is found. Oelsner was an intelligent observer who had a wide circle of acquaintances among the leading men in the assembly and at Paris, but he did not arrive in Paris until long after the incidents here in question.

¹Zinkeisen, *Der Jakobiner-Club*, I, 73. Cites *Mémoires* of Bailly.

²For these names see the extracts published by Aulard.

³*Revue de la Révolution*, vol. XII, p. 49.

⁴II, p. 169, note 1.

⁵*Mémoires*, I, 380. In the *Mémoires de Condorçet sur la Révolution*

writer stated on the 9th of July that a short time before about 100 had been in attendance.¹

II

THE MOTION OF THE BRETON DEPUTIES TO ORGANIZE A NATIONAL ASSEMBLY MAY 14

Everything indicates that the deputies of Bretagne arrived at Versailles imbued with the sentiment that, since the Third Estate formed such a large portion of the na-

française, etc., vol. II, p. 68, the number is given as 150, but as Condorcet was not present and since Grégoire participated, it is evident that the latter's account should be given preference, especially since the small number present is a fact that was specially noted in the meeting. See the extracts in Aulard.

¹Correspondence published by Brette in *La Révolution française*, July-December, 1892. Letter of July 9.

Aulard (I, p. V), supporting his statement upon that of Alexandre Lameth (*Histoire de l'Assemblée constituante*, I, 421), and Zinkeisen (I, 61) without any further qualifications, represent the *curés* of Bretagne as having been members of the club. This statement is certainly contradicted by a mass of contemporaneous evidence. It is true that as far as we know there was nothing whatever in the nature of formal conditions excluding *curés* from attendance at the club, and it is certain that the Breton *curés* at first worked in close understanding with the Breton deputies of the Third Estate in affairs concerning their province; for Le Roulx wrote on May 3, "Dans l'Assemblée provinciale des députés de Bretagne, l'on va faire la concordance des cahiers des députés laïcs et des députés ecclésiastiques et fonder le tout en un seul cahier." This work, however, was given to a committee (letter of Legendre May 5, in which it is stated a committee of twelve was appointed of which he was member) and did not require the union of the two orders in the Breton Committee. In the *Affiches de Rennes* it is expressly stated (No. 43, May 13, 1789) in a letter of the deputies, May 3, that these committeemen were appointed in a meeting of the "Députés du peuple de Bretagne," by which is meant the deputies of the Third Estate,—so that even here the *curés* were not present. In the same paper, No. 42, is a letter from Versailles dated May 1, in which occurs the following passage: "Les députés du Peuple et du Clergé du second ordre de Bretagne, s'occupent d'un mémoire en réponse aux protestations et déclarations du Clergé et de la Noblesse, arrêtées à Saint-Brieuc," which shows that they made common cause against the privileged orders of their province, but also that the writers did not include the *curés* under the name *peuple*.

Further, the *curés* of Bretagne most vigorously seconded the principles of the Third Estate, in the assembly of the Clergy. They

tion, its deputies should, if need be, declare themselves competent to represent it. It is in advocating action in accord with this principle that they first make themselves remarked as a special nucleus in the assembly. As early as May 3, Le Roulx, in discussing the question of the vote by head, wrote that, "It will nevertheless be necessary to attack the question in some manner, and after having at-

formed there the same close unit as their co-deputies in the assembly of the Third Estate, resolutely opposing the measures intended to create difficulties for the latter order. (See *Bulletin de Rennes*, I, No. 18, where an account of their action on June 9 is given relative to the nomination of a committee to occupy itself with the question of the dearth of bread—that is, a committee to act in accord with a similar committee from the other orders, a proceeding to which they objected on the grounds that the States General were not yet formed). This course soon won them the title, the "Macedonian Phalanx." (*Hérault de la nation*, No. 46.)

But instead of joining the Breton Committee or the Breton Club where they could not prepare themselves for the specific work of their order, since these organizations were concerned with the discussions in the Third Estate, they seem to have formed an independent committee in which they prepared their resolutions. At least when they were confronted with the important question as to whether or not they should desert the order of the Clergy to unite with that of the Third Estate, they held a meeting to decide what course to follow. (*Bulletin de Rennes*, I, No. 20. The meeting was evidently held on June 14.) Had the Breton *curés* been accustomed to attend the club, how could the deputies of Saint-Brieuc have written on June 16 the following suspicions, betraying total ignorance of the sentiments of the *curés*: "Il nous arrive journellement des curés qui desertent la chambre de l'église pour se joindre à nous. Dans le nombre de ceux qui sont membre de notre assemblée, on ne compte encore que trois bretons, les deux dont on vous a parlé dans notre précédente et celui du Minihy, évêché de Tréguier. Mais des autres, et surtout de ceux de notre évêché de Saint-Brieuc nous n'avons point encore entendu parler. (!) Il est vrai qu'on assure qu'ils viendront aussitôt que le clergé qui depuis près de huit jours, délibère sur notre arrêté du 10, aura pris une résolution définitive. Si ces gueux de curés nous manquent et ne suivent pas l'exemple de leurs généreux confrères, nous sommes décidés à les dénoncer à la nation comme des gueux, des traîtres à leur patrie. Nos pauvres curés sont bien faibles, ils craignent les évêques qui se moquent d'eux et les bercent de promesses qu'ils n'effectueront pas." In a letter of Boullé of May 22, in speaking of the rector of Pontivy, second of the Breton deputies to desert the Clergy, the writer says: "Nos demeures sont éloignés et comme nos assemblées ne se tiennent pas dans le même lieu, nous nous voyons assez rarement." Boullé was an enthusiastic member of the Breton Club, and had the rector of Pontivy been accustomed to attend the meetings, there could have been no occasion to write this.

Had the Breton Committee been formed by the *curés* and Third Es-

tempted all the means of persuasion in order that the two orders unite to vote by head, if they persist in refusing this important demand, to cut to the quick, in declaring that the Third Estate, being essentially the nation, constitutes truly the representation of the entire kingdom by its representatives at the States General."¹ The same fundamental thought had been incorporated in the important *cahiers* of Rennes, of which article 2 reads: "It is by a fatal error that that which is called the Third Estate, which comprises more than ninety-nine hundredths of the nation, has been qualified *order* and placed in the balance with the two privileged classes. That error ought now to cease, and that which has until now been named Third Estate in the kingdom shall be comprised, with or without the privileged, under the same denomination, and called *People*, or *Nation*, the only name which expresses the truth and is worthy the dignity of the Nation."²

What aid they anticipated from the government in the execution of such a program we have no evidence to show. In their correspondence, they hardly permitted themselves

tate in common, the deputies of the latter order would never have referred to it as an assembly of their order alone, as they did on a number of occasions. Thus in the *Bulletin de Rennes*, No. I, 4, is the passage, "Les députés du Tièrs-Etat de Bretagne se sont réunis." Again in No. 2, "Les députés du Peuple de Bretagne." So also Pellerin on May 15: "Les députés du Tièrs-Etat de Bretagne s'assemblent dans leur chambre particulière."

From the foregoing, I conclude that the *curés* of Bretagne—although individual members may have attended both the Breton Committee and the Breton Club—did not in any real sense form a part of either of these organizations until the union of the orders in June—and we have no positive evidence to show that they did even then. If now we remember that as early as August, 1789, a number of the Breton *curés* were so far out of accord with the Revolution as to resign their commissions as deputies, we may well question whether any of the credit or discredit attaching to the work of the Breton Club is to be assigned to them, especially since the principal work of the club, so far as we know, was performed in its efforts in the period of the conferences and organization of the Assembly, and in aiding to carry through the 4th of August resolutions.

¹ *Archives de Lorient*.

² *Archives nationales*, B A 26, liasse 176^{bis}

to express an opinion regarding the attitude of the government in the opening session. Le Roulx is the only one who gives evidence of great dissatisfaction at Necker's statement that there might be occasions in which the States General should deliberate by order. "I shall not retire to-night," he writes, "until I have caused my views to penetrate to the ministry."¹ It does not seem that they really wished to submit the question of the manner of voting and of verifying credentials to a discussion between the orders. There is, on the other hand, a tacit assumption that the vote by head and the verification in common is the only manner permissible, imposed by an imperative mandate which the Third Estate could not disregard even if a contrary command should come from the king himself.²

For a week after the opening, they hesitated to formulate their action, following a course of inertia. Naturally they opposed any attempt of the Third Estate to act as an order, for this would conflict fundamentally with their position, which required action as the representatives of the nation or not at all. Accordingly, we find Le Roulx vigorously opposing the motion of Malouet on May 6, asking for a formal deputation, inviting the privileged orders to join the Third Estate.³ He was greatly incensed at Malouet and condemned with him even Mounier to whom such deference had been shown at the Breton Club on

¹ Letter of May 5. Also extracted by Kerviler, *Recherches et notices*, art. *Le Roulx*.

² See p. 48 below. That they actually regarded the vote by head as imperative, we must conclude from their action in July relative to the motion of Tallyrand concerning this kind of instructions. In regard to this motion, Le Roulx wrote on July 15: "Nous avons crains qu'il n'interdit que le vote par tête était impératif. C'était l'objet de notre amendement." The *cahiers* of Saint-Brieuc, Brest, Rennes, Vannes, Plœrmel, Quimperlé, and possibly others either expressly demanded or implied that the vote should be by head.

³ Letter of Le Roulx, May 8.

April 30.¹ On May 8, he prepared a motion which he intended to present at once, but of which we hear nothing further. It expressed the policy of inertia and reads as follows: "I, therefore, move, gentlemen, that we come here each day at 9 in the morning and remain until 2 o'clock in the afternoon, in order to await the arrival of the Clergy and the Nobility, and in case of failure by these two corporations, or by one of them, to have united with us by next Tuesday, a motion shall be made on this same day tending to operate without further delay and by the immense means we have in ourselves, the prosperity of our country and the happiness of the best of kings."²

On May 13, the Breton deputation concluded that the time for action had arrived. The obscure manifesto contained in the motion of Le Roulx was replaced by a motion which Le Chapelier was instructed to draw up³ and which he presented in the assembly of the Third Estate the next day.⁴ In a letter of Boullé of May 15, the import of this motion is given as follows: "The second motion (i. e., Le Chapelier's) was to publish a declaration

¹Ibid. "Le soir, je rencontra M. Malouet dans le parc ayant 50 personnes autour de lui. J'attaquai vigoreusement les principes qu'il avait établis le matin, et je le battis si complètement qu'il fut obligé de s'excuser sur sa faible poitrine de ne pouvoir me répondre. Hier matin il arriva avec un discours apprêté, dont la conclusion était la députation. M. de Mounier, de Grenoble, le seconda, et il fut proposé que tous les votants pour la députation passassent d'un côté, et voilà mes moutons à courrir à nommer entre eux des députés."

²Ibid.

³Boullé, May 22. "Cette seconde motion (Le Chapelier's) venait de la Bretagne; elle avait été convenue entre nous et M. Chapelier chargé de la présenter l'avait fait avec applaudissement." *Revue de la Révolution*, vol. XI, p. 16.

The decision of the Breton deputies was reached at 9:30 on the evening of May 13, and the formal draught of the motion was probably not presented to the assembled deputation, for Le Roulx wrote on May 15: "Nous n'eûmes pas le temps de lire cette motion," and yet he was present at the meeting. If it had been laid before the deputation there would have been no necessity of reading it.

⁴Letter of Boullé, May 15. *Revue de la Révolution*, vol. XI, p. 12.

of which the plan was proposed, by which, after a summary of the facts and motives of the inaction of the deputies of the commons, all the deputies of the States General are invited to render themselves to the place of assembly in order to enable it to form itself, protesting that those who refuse will remain responsible toward the public for the consequences of their refusal and for the delay which will be caused by it. This declaration will be remitted to the assembled members of the church and the Nobility, repeated in stronger terms at the end of several days, and even several times if necessary, and in this way prepare the final resolutions of the deputies of the commons."¹

This was a premature signal of revolution. The deputies of Bretagne urged action for which the majority were prepared only a month later. The motion of Le Chapelier involved the assumption of the legislative power of France by the deputies of the Third Estate, and that it was so understood is evident from the speeches we possess of the four days during which it was debated. According to the *Courrier de Provence*, Mirabeau on May 18, in advising a middle course between the motions of Rabaut and Le Chapelier, affirmed, "That a step as memorable, as new, as profoundly decisive as that of declaring ourselves National Assembly and of pronouncing the other orders at fault, can never be too well prepared, too measured, too imposing."² In the *Hérault de la Nation* of May 22, 1789, after a discussion of Le Chapelier's motion and that of Laborde of May 20, the writer says: "After the explanation of their measure, and if the desired union does not take place, the commons are, according to what is assured

¹Letter of Boullé, May 15. *Révue de la Révolution*, vol. XI, pp. 12, 13.

²*Courrier de Provence*, I, p. 58.

us, determined to declare themselves the *ensemble* of the nation; to constitute themselves its natural and legitimate representatives, and in that quality occupy themselves with the public affairs conjointly with those of the church and the Nobility who may wish to join them."¹

But if this motion was revolutionary in that it was clearly intended to prepare the way for the deputies of the Third Estate to assume the powers of a national assembly, the means by which it was intended to execute it were still more so. There was no invitation to argument—indeed the theory upon which the motion was based made argument impossible, because no legal parties capable of argument were recognized as existing—nor was there any appeal to any constituted authority. The appeal was directly to the unorganized nation; to the people as individuals.² The proceedings of the Third Estate

¹No. 46.

²That the intention was to make an appeal to the people directly is not only to be inferred from the motion itself, but was expressly stated at the time. In the *Bulletin de Brest*, I, No. 2, is published under date of May 17, 1789, a letter from the deputies of Brest in which occurs the following passage: "Nous demandons que cette invitation soit imprimée et publiée dans les provinces, avec le compte exacte de nos démarches vis-à-vis les deux ordres privilégiés; ce compte contiendra en outre le détail circonstancié de nos occupations journalières, et des moyens que nous avons mis en usage pour prévenir et éviter tous les inconvénients et les obstacles qu'on nous suscite actuellement. Nous ferons connaître également nos résolutions relatives au cas où la Noblesse insisterait dans la scission qu'elle a formée, et à celui du Clergé de la première classe continuerait à tenir une conduite équivoque et versatile."

In the *Hérault de la Nation*, No. 46, we find under date of May 22: "Si on les parcourt inutilement (i. e., the conferences) si les deux classes séparent de la nation, comme le firent les Tribus de Somaire, les communes, d'après les proposition de MM. de la Borde et de le Chapelier, paraissent décidées à publier, non un manifeste, mais un tableau fidèle de leur conduite, afin d'instruire la France que leurs soins, leurs tentatives, leurs prières, leurs recherches ont été infructueuses; afin d'instruire toutes les provinces de l'empire que des intérêts particulières, des préjugés politiques s'opposent à ce qu'on s'occupe de leurs pressans besoins; afin d'apprendre au peuples libres et aux nations esclaves, que le despotisme ou l'oligarchie ne perdent jamais leur esprit de conquête, d'asservissement et de conservation."

Boullé wrote on May 22: "La nécessité d'instruire le public et de

were to be published for the judgment of the people, and by this means they intended to force their way.

It is significant that in the four days of debate which followed the introduction of the motion of Le Chapelier few, if any, contested the principles contended for by the deputies of Bretagne. The objections were based upon grounds of expediency; later, it was said, if attempts at conciliation failed, they should be forced to adopt measures such as proposed; but every means of persuasion must first be exhausted in order to avoid all causes for reproach to the Third Estate and to assure the approval of the people.¹ When the motion came to the vote it was lost by the crushing majority of 320 to 66,² showing that at this time the number of those who followed the Breton advice was very small.

III

THE BRETON DEPUTIES AND THE CONFERENCES—THEIR STANDING WITH THEIR COLLEAGUES AND THE PUBLIC

During the debates on Le Chapelier's motion, the deputies of Bretagne had insisted that the proposed conferences would not lead to any useful result, that such de-

le faire assister en quelque sorte à nos séances de nous investir de son opinion qui doit faire toute notre force et qui peut seule vaincre la résistance des privilégiés." *Revue de la Révolution*, vol. XI, p. 19.

¹Letter of Boullé, May 22: "Mais en louant le zèle qui l'avait dictée (the motion of Le Chapelier) on a regardé la déclaration dont on donnait le projet comme une manifest qui, par la raideur et l'inflexibilité des principes, peut-être prématurément annoncé, donnait lieu d'imputer aux communes d'avoir haté la rupture dans le temps même où on leur proposait une conciliation." *Revue de la Révolution*, vol. XI, p. 16.

In his letter of May 15, Boullé gives a resumé of the arguments made up to that time. *Ibid.*, 12-14.

See also *Bulletin de Brest*, I, No. 2, pp. 6, 7.

²*Correspondance de MM. les députés des communes de la province d'Anjou*, I, No. 3, p. 45, and Boullé, letter of May 22, *Revue de la Révolution*, vol. XI, p. 16.

ference shown to the privileged orders might even be interpreted by the people as weakness.¹ When the motion was lost, they resigned themselves with sufficiently bad grace to a period of waiting in which they felt that the position of their order was continually more endangered. They now formed a restless group, the group of advance out of accord with the prevailing opinion in their order, taking every opportunity to urge that the time for decisive action had arrived.² That they were kept well informed of the progress of the conferences, we may assume, since their leader, Le Chapelier, was member of the conference committee.³

The necessity of justifying themselves in the eyes of the people, an idea contained in the motion of the 14th of May, had been felt by many outside of the Breton deputation. Laborde, who had favored Le Chapelier's motion as a whole,⁴ on May 20th recurred to this part of it in a new motion in which he asked that a committee be appointed charged with preparing those parts of its pro-

¹*Bulletin de Brest*, I, No. 2, pp. 6, 7.

²On May 24, Champeaux-Palasné wrote: "Nous sommes toujours dans la même position. C'est-à-dire que nous attendons, pour prendre un parti, que nos conférenciers aient fait leur rapport à l'assemblée. Comme les conférences ont commencé hier, le rapport se fera demain, et ce sera le signal de nos grandes opérations." *Société d'Emulation*, etc., vol. XXVI, p. 227.

On June 5, the deputies of Saint-Brieuc wrote: "Toutes ces conférences cependant n'aboutiront à rien, et il en faudra toujours revenir au point de nous constituer en Assemblée nationale. Il y a même longtemps qu'on eût dû prendre ce parti, que la Bretagne avait proposé et on commence à regretter de ne l'avoir pas fait." *Ibid.*, 230.

Le Roux on May 26: "Je présume que M. Le Chapelier va être conduit à renouveler sa motion."

³Le Chapelier, who from the first assumed the leadership of the deputation and frequently acted as its spokesman, seems to have made a strong impression upon the assembly of the Third Estate at a very early period, probably during the debate on the motion of the 14th, in which he was applauded (Boullé, May 22). He was elected on the conference committee by 413 votes. Letter of the deputies of Saint-Brieuc, May 19. *Société d'Emulation*, etc., XXVI, p. 224.

⁴Pellerin, May 20. Correspondence published by Bord, p. 25.

ceedings which the Third Estate might wish to publish and send into the provinces to instruct the people of the measures which had been taken to bring about the union of the orders. This was an attractive proposition and it seemed that the Breton deputies favored it at first,¹ but as the discussion was not completed on the 20th, and hence no decision reached, Laborde and Target on the 22d introduced a new motion in which they asked for the publication of a journal of the proceedings of the assembly to which was to be added an exposé of motives.² But by this time the Breton deputies had seen that such a step would bring the Third Estate into fundamental contradiction with its assumed attitude, for an assembly which published its proceedings could be considered as constituted.³ Thus, anxious as they were to explain to the people their real position, they voted against the motion, which was lost by an overwhelming majority.⁴

When on May 28th the Third Estate received the letter of the king asking that the conferences be renewed in the presence of the guard of the seals and the royal commissioners, the deputies of Bretagne were placed in an extremely embarrassing position. The letter was a fresh blow to their hopes, for to obey meant new delay, when

¹Le Roulx on May 22, as also Maisonblanche and the deputies of Saint-Brieuc, favored the motion of Laborde. For Maisonblanche see Kerviler, *Recherches et notices*, art. *Maisonblanche*.

²The fullest account of the debates over these two motions is found in the *Correspondance de MM. les députés des communes de la province d'Anjou*, I, 30-53.

³Champeaux-Palasné wrote on May 24, relative to this motion: "Comme, jusqu'au moment où nous sommes constitués en corps de nation, nous ne pouvons rien faire qui aient un air de délibération légale sans courir les risques qu'on nous objecte que nous admettons la distinction des ordres, on sentit le piège, et la motion fut rejetée à la pluralité de 387 voix contre 39." *Société d'Emulation*, XXVI, 227.

⁴Legendre and Moyot, May 22: "Et cette motion a été rejetée de mon avis et de l'avis presque'unanime de la province." MSS. *Archives de Brest*.

they had already for two weeks insisted upon the futility of negotiations. They were at that very moment speculating upon the advisability of renewing Le Chapelier's motion of May 14 and of constituting the National Assembly,¹ and now the king seemed to throw his authority on the side of the privileged orders to embarrass the Third Estate. They believed in the good faith of Louis XVI., to whom, according to all our trustworthy evidence, they were sincerely attached. The king had granted the Third Estate of Bretagne many of the demands made at the close of 1788 and the beginning of 1789,² for which a feeling of profound gratitude had manifested itself throughout the entire province. Their correspondence indicates that the deputies fully shared this feeling upon their arrival at Versailles.³ Until now the government had held aloof from the contest between the orders, and to the deputies of Bretagne its position seemed unknown.⁴ Nor did they wish to accept the letter of May 28 as an evidence of the king's real attitude. Following a long-standing tradition, they laid the blame upon the evil counselors who surrounded him.⁵

But whatever their regard for Louis XVI., or whatever their faith in his good intentions, they were not prepared

¹See note 2, p. 45, above. On May 26, Boullé wrote: "Il me semble que ce n'est plus le temps de temporiser et d'user de ménagements et que nous ne pouvons nous dispenser de prendre un parti dont ma première lettre pourra vous instruire." *Revue de la Révolution*, vol. XI, p. 50.

²For these demands see Pocquet, *Les origines de la Révolution en Bretagne*, II, chaps. 2 and 3. To these demands the election regulations of the 16th of March, expressly for Bretagne, may be said to be the response. *Archives Nationales*, B²25, liasse 43. Reprinted in the *Société d'Emulation* with the correspondence of the deputies of Saint-Brieuc.

³See pp. 57-59, below.

⁴*Ibid.*

⁵This thought is frequently expressed in the correspondence of the deputies of Bretagne. See note 1, p. 59, below.

to accept him as umpire in the dispute between the orders. This the nation must decide—the nation, according to their conception, as represented in the deputies of the Third Estate.¹ Otherwise a simple decision of the Council might at one stroke dispose of the pretensions of their order. In this crisis, they did not hesitate to reject the king's mediation, especially since the Nobility had by a new vote just declared that the vote by order and the veto of each order over the decisions of the others were inherent in the constitution of the monarchy.² When the *Sénéchaussée* of Rennes was called, Glezen moved that the Third Estate now constitute itself an active assembly, since no compromise was henceforth to be thought of; that all previous conferences had led to nothing useful, and that all future ones would be equally futile—they might even give rise to a decision of the king of which the consequences could become very dangerous.³ To this Le Chapelier added that, with the act of constituting, a deputation to the king with an address containing the senti-

¹The relatively moderate Legendre wrote on June 2 that the preceding evening they had discussed in the assembly of the province a mémoire of the avocats of Rennes against the parliament of Paris which had condemned their address to the king, of the beginning of February, to be burned (see p. 21). Regarding this mémoire, he says: "Mais j'ai particulièrement et le premier observé la nécessité de la corriger dans la partie où on invoque l'autorité du roi comme le refuge suprême des dissensions qui peuvent s'élever *entre les ordres*." (Italics in the original.) *Archives de Brest*. The inference is clear that he did not recognize the king's authority in this question and also that he was not alone in taking this stand, since he was the *first*.

Under the date June 4 is entered in the *Bulletin de Brest*, I, No. 8: "M. le Chapelier . . . a dévoilé l'inexactitude du rapport qui venait d'être fait des conférences, et les atteints données par les commissaires du roi aux droits de la nation, par l'observation qu'ils avaient faite que le roi n'avait pas renoncé à la décision dans son conseil, des difficultés qui pourraient s'élever entre les trois ordres."

²Letter of Boullé, May 28, *Revue de la Révolution*, vol. XI, p. 115. Duquesnoy, I, p. 52.

³*Récits des séances des députés des communes*, p. 44.

⁴*Bulletin de Rennes*, I, No. 13.

ment of the order be voted.¹ Nearly the entire Breton deputation joined in the demand of Rennes, as also did Camus who supported his opinion by a speech fully setting forth his motives.² But again the Breton proposition was lost.

On the 28th, before the vote was taken, it became evident to the deputies of Bretagne that their motion would be rejected. It seems that some of them then bent their efforts to prevent the acceptance of the renewal of the conferences without conditions.³ Mirabeau on May 29,

¹Ibid.

²Boullé May 28: "Cet avis (i. e., that of Rennes) a été presque généralement adopté par les députés de Bretagne." *Revue de la Révolution*, vol. XI, p. 115. *Bulletin de Rennes*, I, No. 13.

³Boullé, May 28: "Mais il paraît que le plus grand nombre est d'avis d'adopter encore les conférences."

Le Roulx wrote on the same date: "Mais nous tâcherons au moins que le résultat des conférences qui se tiendront chez Monsieur le garde des sceaux ne soit pas seulement porté au roi par les commissaires qu'il aura nommé, mais que le procès-verbal de ces conférences soit arrêté et signé tous les jours par les commissaires des trois ordres et présenté au roi par un nombre de députés." This amendment passed the next day. *Récits*, p. 48. It is almost certain that the deputies of Bretagne were actively concerned in the attack upon the bureau on the 30th of May, relative to the question as to whether the conferences had been accepted under the condition that a deputation be sent to the king *with* or *before* their re-opening, for Le Roulx, in a letter of May 30, writes: "Il résulte une rixe de parole entre l'assemblée et le bureau soutenu par une portion des membres malintentionnés qui adoptaient le mot avec."

In regard to this incident, the *Bulletin de Brest* says, under date of May 30: "Le trouble et le désordre se sont emparés de la chambre des communes, et pendant cinq heures entières on a demandé à aller aux voix, pour confirmer ou rétracter les conférences annoncées par le doyen, sans s'être assuré de la députation préalable au roi. Dans ce trouble, et par une circonstance propre à l'augmenter, il a été vérifié que les opinions recueillies dans la nuit d'hier, portaient évidemment contre l'acception des conférences; que le doyen et ses adjoints avaient abusé de la confiance de l'assemblée, en comptant pour les voix qui n'avaient accepté les conférences qu'à la condition qu'elles auraient lieu dans la salle commune, les trois ordres ajournés, et non dans le cabinet de Mgr. le Garde-des-Sceaux et devant des commissaires, que Sa Majesté prendrait dans ses ministres et dans son conseil."

It is to be noticed that Le Chapeller's idea of addressing themselves to the king is involved in this difficulty.

To determine whether the amendment contained the word *avec* or

in pointing out the dangers to the Third Estate, whether it accepted or rejected the mediation of the king, urged the deputation and address demanded by Le Chapelier the day before as a condition of acceptance.¹ The deputies of Bretagne were drawn to support this plan by two powerful considerations, namely, the necessity they felt of acquainting the king with the real sentiments of the Third Estate and the opportunity it gave them to inform the people of their position. The address, drawn up by Le Chapelier,² was presented on June 6.

après recourse was had to the copies kept by the different deputies, since the secretaries were unable to determine the question positively. The reporter for the *Journal de Paris* wrote for the session of May 30: "Dans presque toutes les copies on a trouvé *avec*, en ligue, mais effacé, et *après*, au-dessus, entre deux lignes, mais en entiers, ce qui a prouvé que le mot *après* avait été substitué et préféré au mot *avec*, mis d'abord dans l'amendement." (No. 152.)

This was certainly the result of more than a mere accident. It is evident that nearly all had understood *avec*, or why should they have entered it in their notes originally? Certainly no one made a formal correction of the word on the evening of May 29 or the discussion in the assembly could never have arisen on the 30th. How then did this systematic change of the word come about? We can not believe that the word *après* was substituted for *avec* spontaneously by the different deputies. By the energy with which several Breton deputies expressed themselves on the subject, and by the fact that the change was entirely in accord with their sentiments, the thought suggests itself very strongly that we have here a maneuver of the Breton Club in instigating the change of words in question.

¹*Courrier de Provence*, I, pp. 116, 117.

²Kerviler, *Recherches et notices*, says, on the word of Pellerin, that Le Chapelier drew up the address. Art. *Le Chapelier*. *Bulletin de Rennes*, I, No. 23: "On la (the address) dit de M. le Chapelier. Il a été généralement applaudi."

According to Boullé, Le Chapelier's original intention was "d'envoyer au roi une députation solennelle chargée d'éclaircir sa religion, de lui mettre sous les yeux l'exposé de ce qui s'est passé jusqu'à ce jour, le résultat des premières conférences et une adresse qui, avec l'impression de nos sentiments, contiendront les principes dont nous ne pouvons nous écarter et en vertu desquels nous déclarerons nous constituer en Assemblée Nationale." May 28. *Revue de la Révolution*, II, p. 115. The address, then, presented after the action of June 10 was outlined by Le Chapelier as early as May 28. See the *Procès-verbal*, I, 41 ff.

In the address presented on June 6, Le Chapelier expressed the Breton hatred of the privileged orders, but also a desire to be just. While denying in diplomatic language the authority of the king to

This energetic urging of revolutionary measures caused the deputies of Bretagne to be viewed in a very unfavorable light by many even of their own order. Some believed them in league with Mirabeau who was still regarded as an unprincipled agitator. Such was, as early as May 7, the opinion of Duquesnoy,¹ who, like the *Gazette de Leyde*,² credited them with the project of dissolving the States General. He believed that they desired merely to humiliate the Nobility; that if they succeeded in this it was of little consequence to them whether or not the nation were free. On May 30, a correspondent whose name is not known wrote to the ministry: "We have learned from a trustworthy source, and this merits the most serious attention, we have learned that the deputies of Bretagne have formed the project of thwarting all the operations of the chamber and of so arousing the minds as to prevent the holding of the States General. It has been remarked that the opinions the most extreme and the most violent come always from them. They have a double interest in sustaining their system. It is said that their province pays much less than the others and that they fear an equal partition. They have an old quarrel with the Nobility of their country and, always occupied with the vengeance they meditate against it, they

decide the difficulty then existing between the Third Estate and the privileged orders, he makes a pathetic appeal to him to place his confidence in his people who were sincerely attached to him, rather than ally himself with the aristocracy, enemy of both himself and his people.

¹*Journal d'Adrien Duquesnoy*, I, 9. Writing of Mirabeau he says: "Il me paraît évident, et à tous les bons esprits, que, M. Necker n'ayant pas voulu acheter son silence ou son appui, il veut faire dissoudre les états, pour entraîner le ministère dans leur chute. Malheureusement, il a beaucoup de partisans. Tous les Bretons sont de son bord; ces gens-là ne voyant dans l'assemblée des états qu'un moyen, une occasion d'écraser la Noblesse, contre laquelle ils ont une fureur insensée, il leur import peu que la nation soit libre, heureuse, pourvu qu'ils humilient la Noblesse."

²See note 4, p. 35, above.

have imagined that, if the States General were not held, they would cause all the odium of that rupture to fall upon it, and that the Bretons, irritated by this supposed maneuver, would persecute (*poursuivraient*) it to the last extreme and end by annihilating it. Such is the project of the deputation of Bretagne; we are assured of it from a good source. This project has transpired. The government ought to imitate the Chamber and second its views."¹ To oppose this supposed project a meeting composed of deputies of the Third Estate was called on May 30, at which twenty-five were present. Here it was resolved to watch closely the Breton deputies, to warn their colleagues against their designs, and to league themselves against all their motions.²

By another element in the assembly and by the people outside, the deputies of Bretagne were much better understood. Bretagne had won the admiration of the people of Paris and Versailles during its revolution, so that when the deputies of Rennes entered at the opening session they were singled out by the spectators as the mark of special applause.³ In the assembly they had already won the title, "Grenadiers of the States General."⁴

IV

THE TRIUMPH OF THE BRETON CLUB, JUNE 10-17

Although the Breton deputies had found but little support when they attempted on the 28th of May to have rejected unconditionally the king's offer of mediation, when

¹ *La Révolution française*, vol. XXIII, p. 461.

² *Ibid.* Letter of May 31 and June 1.

³ *Revue des Etats Généraux d'après des journaux et des correspondances inédites*, by Pellerin, published by Bord with the correspondence of Pellerin.

⁴ Letter of the deputies of Saint-Brieuc, May 19. *Société d'Emulation*, XVI, 224.

it became apparent that the new conferences were also to end in failure, others too began to feel the necessity of decisive action.¹ Of these many saw in the Breton Club, which at this time assembled almost every evening,² a convenient means of preparation as well as a nucleus of energy,³ so that its attendance and influence suddenly increased enormously. It was undoubtedly, as Le Téo supposes, at this time⁴ that Dubois-Crancé presented himself at the club to ask admission for himself and the deputies of several other *bailliages*. "Then," says this deputy, "the Breton Club became the club of all the deputies recognized as the defenders of the cause of the people."⁵ For several days before the decisive 10th of June it had been said that at the close of the *procès-verbal* of the conferences the Third Estate would constitute itself an active assembly,⁶ but in the feeling, becoming each day more intense, that a crisis faced the order, it was left for the Breton Club to formulate a definite resolution. It was

¹ Thus the deputies of Saint-Brieuc on June 5: "Il y a même longtemps qu'on eût dû prendre ce parti, que la Bretagne avait proposé et on commence à regretter de ne l'avoir pas fait." See also the letter of June 3 in *Relations des événements*, etc. *La Révolution française*, vol. XXIII, p. 467. Boullé, June 8.

² All our evidence indicates that the month of June marks the period of the greatest activity of the Breton Club. In the correspondence of Pellerin numerous meetings are mentioned at the close of May and the beginning of June. On June 5, Le Roulx wrote: "Nous avons actuellement assemblée tous les soirs à la chambre provinciale."

³ See extract from Dubois-Crancé, Aulard, I, *Intro.*, XII.

⁴ *La Révolution française*, vol. XXXVI, p. 391.

Dubois-Crancé says that on entering the assembly of the Breton deputies, he repeated an expression which had been used in the assembly of the Third Estate—"La noblesse tranche; le clergé ruse; la cour corrompt; nous n'avons pas de temps à perdre pour déjouer les complots de nos ennemis." Aulard, I, *Intro.*, XII. These words were pronounced in the evening session of May 29 by a deputy from Picardy (*Hérault de la nation*, No. 50), so that Dubois-Crancé must have spoken them between that date and the 10th of June; otherwise they would no longer have had any application.

⁵ Aulard, I, *Intro.*, XII.

⁶ See note 1 above.

here that Sieyès' motion was first introduced and discussed during the evenings of the 8th and 9th of June.¹ "At 9 o'clock I went to the *Salon de Bretagne*," wrote Boullé on June 10. "It was this evening truly the temple of patriotism; all the better citizens of all the provinces were assembled there. They examined, they discussed the means of constituting an active assembly, and the plan of the Abbé Sieyès of whom I have already spoken, appeared to be generally approved. But a deputy, in communicating some information which he said he had received from a reliable source, excited great alarm. A committee of aristocrats, daily assembled at Madame de Polignac's to oppose the views of the nation and to plot its destruction, had decreed the sinister project which it was upon the point of causing the government to adopt. Under pretext of the divisions which had from the first paralyzed the States General and rendered them incapable of fulfilling their mission, they resolved to dissolve them, or at least, to prorogue them, which differs only in the term. A royal session was to be held before the end of the week; and the parliaments, regretting that they have obtained too much, reassuming the exercise of a right which they had recognized as belonging to the nation only, after having so long exercised it to the prejudice of the nation, were to register all the laws, constitutional, political, and civil which circumstances or the needs of the government might demand. M. d'Esprémenil, the soul of this committee, at which the letter of the king which caused the renewal of the conferences had been drawn up, at the moment when our pressing invitation embarrassed the Clergy, and at which, to our misfortune and shame, several of our members attend, M. d'Esprémenil answered

¹Boullé, letter of June 9. *Revue de la Révolution*, vol. XII.

for the parliament of Paris, and the parliaments of the provinces of which they expected soon to receive the consent, had been written to. These reports, which by their consistency and by the manner in which they were made did not lack the appearance of truth, caused everyone to understand that there was not a moment to be lost, and it was resolved to hasten with all possible efforts the deliberation which, in giving us an existence, would put us at the same time in condition to defend it. It was with these dispositions, that we presented ourselves at the session of the next day."¹

Thus, for the third time, the formal motion to constitute came from the Breton deputies or their club, for the motion of Sieyès on June 10 was the same, in its essential points, as that of Le Chapelier on May 14, renewed, in effect, on the 28th. Circumstances, necessity, had now driven the Third Estate to the point where the deputies of Bretagne had really arrived before leaving their province. Their previous attitude was now vindicated, their predictions had come true, for the Third Estate now felt itself surrounded by difficulties and dangers which many thought would have been avoided had the present step been taken earlier.²

To prevent further temporizing, to confront the privileged orders bluntly with the issue and force them to assume a definite attitude, the Breton Club intended to force its motion through the assembly with the least possible delay and to begin the call of the *Bailliages* and *Séné-*

¹*Revue de la Révolution*, vol. XII, pp. 49-50.

²Boullé, June 3, wrote: "Au reste on a eu occasion d'observer dans la discussion combien les conférences qu'on avait eu la faiblesse d'accepter étaient dangereuses, la lettre du roi qui y avait donné lieu ayant été évidemment surprise à sa religion." *Ibid.*, p. 8. See also note 1, p. 53, above.

chaussées on the same day.¹ It was, undoubtedly, to prevent the adjournment of the reply from the privileged orders that Sieyès proposed to allow only one hour between the summons and the beginning of the verification of credentials.² But in this attempt to carry both the assembly of the Third Estate and the other orders by storm they failed, as Boullé writes, largely through their own impatience,³ the decisive vote not being taken until the evening session.

In introducing his motion, Sieyès announced that it was merely preparatory in character, and that should it pass, he had another to present to the assembly.⁴ Without doubt he referred to the motion he introduced on the 15th, proposing to constitute under the name: "*Les seuls représentants vérifiés et connus de la nation française*," which he had also submitted to the Breton Club, or was to submit, before introducing it in the assembly,⁵ and for which he gained the vigorous support of that body. But the introduction of this motion led the assembly into a debate over subtleties, over nice distinctions, which could be nothing less than congenial to the character of the Breton deputies who were noted for the clearness with which they were accustomed to express themselves. In their minds,

¹Boullé wrote on June 10: "Mais on désirait de la faire passer promptement et avant que le Clergé et la Noblesse eussent désarmé, afin de leur faire de suite la sommation de se réunir pour la vérification des pouvoirs et de commencer en conséquence dans le jour l'appel des bailliages et sénéchaussées, c'est ce qu'on entreprit et ce qu'on réussit, en effet, à empêcher en entraînant de longues discussions." *Revue de la Révolution*, vol. XII, p. 53.

²*Récits*, p. 103.

³Boullé, June 10: "L'impatience même de ceux qui voulaient faire passer la motion, contraria leur objet et les éloignait de leur but; des cris s'élevèrent à plusieurs reprises pour demander les voix, mais ils ne servirent qu'à faire perdre près d'une heure dans le tumulte." *Revue de la Révolution*, vol. XII, p. 53.

⁴*Ibid.*, p. 52.

⁵*Exposé de la conduite de M. Mounier*, etc. Paris, 1789, p. 5.

long decided to urge the Third Estate to assume the legislative power of France, if necessary, there could be no need for niceties intended to save legal appearances. On the 16th, Legrande moved to constitute under the name "National Assembly" without seeming to arouse much interest.¹ But he had given the Breton Club the suggestion of a title which corresponded fully to the principles of many of its members, and which was now seized upon to make an end of all the obscurities in which the assembly had been involved for the last two days. The club abandoned entirely the motion it had until now sustained, declared itself with enthusiasm for the name "National Assembly,"² and in the evening session of the same day Sieyès introduced the motion which was adopted the following morning, and completed the revolutionary act for which the Breton deputies had in effect fought since the 14th of May.

It is evident, then, that the Breton deputies and the Breton Club had furnished the initiative, the courage, the force which drove the Revolution over its first great crisis, or, perhaps, we may say that they formed the element which forced the formal declaration of the Revolution.

V

DIRECT OPPOSITION TO THE GOVERNMENT—THE "OATH OF THE
TENNIS COURT"—THE ROYAL SESSION—THE IMPER-
ATIVE MANDATES—THE JULY REVOLUTION

Bertrand de Moleville assures us that at first the intentions of the Breton deputies was "To do everything

¹*Point du Jour*, I, No. 1, p. 1.

²*Droz, Histoire du règne de Louis XVI.*, II, 211, says the motion was received with enthusiasm at the club. Since it was introduced in the evening session, it is to be supposed that the club met between the two sessions of the assembly, for certainly Sieyès would not change his motion without first consulting those who had been his principal allies in the motions of the 10th and the 15th.

for the king, and for reestablishing his authority in such a manner that the Nobility and the parliaments could never injure it."¹ This is in full accord with the sentiments expressed in their correspondence, without exception. But it is necessary to distinguish sharply between

¹*Mémoires particuliers sur le règne de Louis XVI.*, I, p. 44. Extracts in Aulard, I, p. XIII. Both Zinkeisen (I, 66) and Chérest (III, 120) accepted the version of Moleville's account as he gives it in his *Histoire de la Révolution*, in which he says that his interview with the Breton deputies took place during the first days of June. According to his *Mémoires* it was, "Quelques jours après l'ouverture des états généraux." The latter is the correct account as far as the time of the interview is concerned, for we find in a letter of Poulain de Corblon, deputy of Saint-Brieuc, dated May 11, the following passage: "Comme elles (observations in a previous letter of Champeaux-Palasne) sont le résultat de la conversation que nous avons eue sur l'affaire de Sieur P . . . avec M. de Bertrand, ancien intendant de Bretagne," etc. (*Société d'Emulation*, XXVI, 220.) Since Moleville represents this as his first meeting with the Breton deputies, it could not have been later than May 10, for Champeaux-Palasne had already written to Saint-Brieuc the results of the conversation when Corblon wrote. It is evident, then, that Moleville's memory served him poorly, for he says that the Breton deputies were at this time in doubt as to whom they should elect to the presidency, but thought the Duke of Orleans would be the most agreeable to the king—at a time when there was neither president nor assembly, and when the Duke of Orleans was still in the chamber of the Nobility.

Building upon this confused account Zinkeisen says, "Dies geschah, wie gesagt, in den ersten Tagen des Monats Juni 1789 und war wohl mit die nächste Veranlassung zu einem förmlichen Bruche des Club Breton mit dem Hofe und dem Ministerium." If this conjecture were true, then this formal break with the government, of which we find no trace in the contemporaneous records, would have to be referred to the middle of May. As is shown below, it was not until long after this time that the king and Necker lost their popularity with the Breton deputies, yet it is quite possible that Necker's refusal of the Breton alliance or leadership may have determined the latter to act independently, for the time coincides with the introduction of Le Chapelier's motion of the 14th of May.

Using this same account of Moleville, Chérest has been led, it seems, to an entire misconception of the early position of the Breton deputation and its club. Moderate until the beginning of June, neglected by Necker, the club fell into the hands of the leaders of the revolutionary party, of whom it then became the tool, and was henceforth the violent organization which it has been supposed to have been. This happened when Sieyès introduced his motions of the 10th and the 15th of June. But, says Chérest, "D'abord il s'abstint de lui démasquer toutes ses batteries, de peur d'effaroucher la modération relative de la plupart de ses membres. Il ne lui parla que de constituer

the king and the court—between the king and the “government.” Too frequently, in their minds, the acts of the government were the results of deceit, of intrigues of the ministers, of the court, or of the Nobility.¹ For the latter, their distrust and hatred was as deep-seated and bitter as the persistency with which they clung to their belief in their king was pathetic. Nor did the letter of the king on the 28th of May, the orders of the Royal Session, and the concentration of troops in July cause any essential change in this sentiment.² Just what they meant by

l'assemblée sous le titre d'assemblée des seuls représentants vérifiés et connus.” (III, 120, 121.) On the contrary, as has been shown above, Sieyès, so far from being under the necessity of fearing that he would shock the moderation of the members of the club, was merely renewing, under different circumstances, the very demands the Breton deputies had fought for for almost a full month, and that with an intolerance and vigor which had led to the suspicion that they wished to disrupt the States General by the confusion resulting from their violence. Under these circumstances, but little credit of initiative is due to Sieyès, nor is it even certain that his motion of the 10th of June was introduced in the assembly of the Third Estate in the form in which he had originally drawn it, for it was debated at the club for at least two evenings, and it finally entered the assembly as much the motion of the club as that of Sieyès. The same thoughts arise relative to the motions of the 15th and the 16th. To represent Sieyès as the important element in the acts which constituted the National Assembly is to misrepresent the relative value of the forces at work.

¹This feeling is expressed upon numerous occasions. See especially the letters of the deputies of Saint-Brieuc, of April 28, July 19; of Boullé of June 3, 10, 13, 23, 24, and 28; of Le Roulx, June 5, 21, 23; and of Pellerin, July 10.

²Boullé, after the Royal Session, when in the most terrible excitement, could find in his heart no other feeling for the king except that of pity or sympathy for the misfortunes brought upon him by his evil counselors. “L'on est séparé en gémissant sur les maux que pouvait entraîner un coup aussi funeste et sur le malheur d'un bon roi dont on a si cruellement trompé la religion, qu'on l'arme contre son peuple dans le temps qu'il en était adoré.” June 23. On the same day: “Ce n'est pas au cœur du roi que tout ceci est imputé; on lui rend encore justice; on n'en veut qu'à ceux qui l'ont trompé. Serait-il possible qu'un seul jour souillât pour jamais toute la gloire de son règne?” On the 26th: “Oh! que les rois sont malheureux! le nôtre allait recevoir les plus grandes preuves de notre amour; sa puissance allait s'accroître et s'affermir et c'est dans ce moment qu'on lui fait prononcer le malheur de la nation.”

Le Roulx could write on June 21, after the announcement of the

the "authority" of the king is not clear, but it is certain that they did not mean his absolute authority. When, through the medium of Moleville, they asked to be directed by Necker, they did not intend to surrender to the minister those rights which were now generally recognized as belonging to the nation, and which in their minds included the power of determining the form of the States General.¹ But because they had in this general way evinced a desire to be guided by Necker, this minister has been blamed for not entering into intelligence with them in order to keep them in the channels of moderation in which it is supposed they were at first inclined to move.² If, however, we ask in what this moderation consisted, we learn that it was merely good will toward, and a certain degree of faith in Louis XVI. and his popular minister. While the question of the organization of the States General was under discussion, what proposition could Necker have made to a group of men who had from the first distinguished themselves by their intolerance and the uncompromising attitude they assumed toward the privileged orders, advocating action on May 14 as radical as that concluded in the revolutionary resolution of June 17?

These favorable sentiments regarding the king and Necker gave them but little assurance over the steps the government might take relative to the action of the Third

Royal Session which had created such uneasiness, and after the insult to the dignity of the deputies of the Third Estate in the unceremonious closing of their hall on the 20th: "Qu'il (the king) n'a pour but dans la séance royale que d'en faire modifier quelques expressions que nos adversaires aurent présentées sous un mauvais jour!"

¹See pp. 47, 48.

²Zinkeisen (I, 66) says: "Nichts wäre also damals vielleicht leichter gewesen, als den Club Breton zu einem bequemen Werkzeuge des Hofes und der Regierung zu machen, wenn dieses Werkzeug nur in die Hände eines geschickteren Ministers gefallen wäre, als Necker war." See also Chérest, *La chute de l'ancien régime*, III, 120, and the extract from Moleville, in Aulard, I, p. XV.

Estate in constituting itself the National Assembly, for the government remained silent, whereas they felt that the king was still surrounded by the enemies of their order.¹ The fears of a *coup d'état*, which had been so vividly felt at the Breton Club on the evening of the 9th of June, were not allayed by the decisive action which had followed by which they had intended to put themselves in a state of defense. They now seem to have begun to fear that an attempt would be made to drive the assembly asunder by force of arms. To escape from this menace, it seems that the idea arose among the members of the Breton Club to transfer the assembly to Paris where it would be under the protection of the large population entirely favorable to its pretensions.² To prevent a proposition to this effect being made to the assembly on June 20, Mounier asserts that he introduced his motion of the *Jeu de Paume*, which pledged the assembly not to separate until it had made a constitution.³ Mallet du Pan, writing in 1800, states positively that Sieyès, Barnave, and the Breton Club had formed the definite project of transferring the assembly to the capitol, and that they arrived at the Tennis Court intending to take advantage of the circumstances to execute their resolution.⁴

According to the trustworthy Grégoire, it is to the initiative of the Breton Club that the action of the assembly on June 23, in refusing to leave the hall following the command of the king, is to be ascribed. That the announcement of a Royal Session should have created spec-

¹Boullé, June 26. *Revue de la Révolution*, XIII, p. 73.

²Le Roulx on June 21, enumerating the dangers of a royal session, describes the attitude of Paris as "Le noir image d'une capitale en fermentation pour nous."

³*Recherches sur les causes qui ont empêché les Français de devenir libre*, 1792, I, p. 296, note.

⁴*Mercure britannique*, V, 19, cited by Aulard, I, pp. XII, XIII.

ulation among its members and an attempt to learn what the dispositions of the government were, was inevitable, but it can not have been until late on the 22d that they received truthful information, for only twelve to fifteen members were present at their meeting that evening, and Le Roulx, to whom the proceedings of the council were partly known, assured his municipality on the same day that nothing would be done against the work so far accomplished by the assembly. The Archbishop of Paris, he said, had indeed misled the king and caused him to take an unfavorable resolution, but Necker had since persuaded him to change his decision. "Instructed of what the court meditated for the next day," says Grégoire, "each article was discussed by all; and all expressed their opinions as to what was to be done. The first resolution was to remain in the hall despite the interdiction of the king. It was agreed that before the opening of the session we would circulate in the groups of our colleagues to announce to them what was about to pass under their eyes and what it was necessary to oppose to it. But, said someone, is the opinion of twelve to fifteen persons able to determine the conduct of twelve hundred deputies? It was answered that the particle *on* has a magical force; we will say: This is what the court will do, and, among the patriots, they (*on*) are agreed upon such measures. *They* signifies four hundred as well as ten.—The expedient succeeded."¹

The important influence of the Breton deputies and their club in the resolutions of the assembly had in July

¹*Mémoires*, I, 380. See note 5, p. 36. Using the somewhat obscure account of this session of the club given in the *Mémoires de Condorcet*, Zinkelsen reached a conclusion exactly the contrary of the one given here, that is, that the club decided to prevent a collision with the government and to use its influence the next day to restrain the more violent deputies. The club is, therefore, represented as a moderating element in the assembly!

gained them an enormous reputation. On the 24th, after the charges against the deputation had been dismissed and the credentials of its members declared sufficient, the assembly, contrary to its custom, greeted their reentrance with a burst of applause.¹ Duquesnoy, who in May had held such an unfavorable opinion of them, admitted on August 21 that they were "extremely celebrated," although he added that they were not statesman-like, being too impatient and acting without sufficient diplomacy.² Their power in the assembly is evidenced by the elections early in July, which they discussed beforehand,³ for in the new bureau were Grégoire, Sieyès, and Le Chapelier.⁴ In the committees the names of those who frequented their club are strongly represented. On July 7 Bouche, Volney, Lanjuinais, Lepeaux, Petion, Glezen, and one of the Lameths were included in the preparatory committee.⁵ Kervélégan, Petion, Grégoire, Corroller-du-Moustoir, and Robespierre, were assigned to the deputation asking for the withdrawal of the troops.⁶ On July 24 Sieyès and Le Chapelier were appointed on the committee on the constitution,⁷ and on August 3 the latter was elected president of the assembly.

The imperative mandate of which a number of Breton deputies were bearers caused them considerable embarrassment upon several occasions. They consisted in

¹Le Roulx, July 24, and the *Bulletin de Brest*, I, No. 26.

²*Journal*, I, 263.

³Writing of this election on July 4, Le Roulx says: "La minorité de la Noblesse et la majorité du Clergé, nous fit redire à l'assemblée de Bretagne, qu'elles avaient pensé que tel et tel seraient les présidents et officiers qui nous conviendraient, mais qu'elles réuniraient leurs suffrages aux nôtres. Nous étions à peu près d'accord dans nos vues: mais vous voyez que les députés de Bretagne se sont acquis une grande considération."

⁴*Procès-verbal*, I, No. 13.

⁵*Procès-verbal*, I, No. 17.

⁶*Ibid.*, No. 19.

⁷*Bulletin de Rennes*, I, No. 35.

clauses forbidding them to consent to any measures prejudicial to the rights and privileges of the province, not fully incorporated in the French State, or to consent to new taxes without reserving the right of Bretagne to sanction them.¹ The deputies at their second meeting at Versailles seemed to have recognized the importance of these instructions and their incompatibility with the nature of an assembly pretending to legislate sovereignly for the entire nation.² On June 14, when the powers of Nantes and Rennes were read, a general murmur arose.³ Dupont de Nemours declared that the bearers of such instructions possessing a veto upon the actions of the assembly could not be admitted as members of it.⁴ Le Chapelier was able to postpone the decision of the question by observing that the assembly was at that time not concerned with the nature of their powers but with the regularity of their credentials.⁵ Their attitude upon this subject was throughout vacillating and irrational, dictated, it seems, by local spirit and the circumstances of the moment. Although they realized that they could not recognize such instructions, they ignored the letter of the king on June 27 authorizing all bearers of imperative mandates to apply to their constituents for new orders, and refused to allow the question to be decided in the assembly. The motion of Tallyrand on July 6, condemnatory of the imperative mandate, considerably alarmed

¹These instructions were given especially by the *sénéchaussées* of Rennes, Nantes, Vannes, Dol, Fougères, Dinan, Quimperlé, Carhaix, and Châteaulin. *Procès-verbal*, II, No. 40 bis. Here Guérande is also given, but in the correspondence of Pellerin, published by Bord, the committee and the mayor of Guérande deny that there is anything in the *cahiers* which binds the freedom of its representative to act according to his judgment. pp. 105, 106.

²Legendre and Moyot, May 1. MSS. Archives of Brest.

³*Bulletin de Brest*, I, No. 11.

⁴*Procès-verbal*, I, the introductory number, p. 73.

⁵Le Roulx, June 15.

them. Received with enthusiasm and supported by the eloquent Lally-Tollendal and a number of others, it seemed as if it would be adopted,¹ when the deputies of Bretagne began a maneuver to defeat it.² On July 7, Legendre and Moyot wrote relative to this motion: "It will not have escaped you how much importance we attach to it with regard to the preservation of the franchises of the province of Bretagne. That article is particularly recommended in the powers of Rennes, Nantes, and Fougères; it is so likewise in the wish and conscience of all the deputies of the province, especially under the present circumstances in which our prelates and nobles affect to reproach us with the desertion of the Breton privileges."³ Aside from these motives, they were influenced by distrust of Tallyrand whom they did not know at this time,⁴ fearing that he concealed under his motion the declaration that the vote by head was not imperative. They therefore prepared an amendment to prevent this consequence should they fail in defeating the motion entirely.⁵ Sieyès seems to have acted once more as their spokesman, for on July 7 he moved that the assembly declare that there was no "occasion to deliberate."⁶ This was the formula which had already been agreed upon by the deputies of Bretagne,⁷ and when Sieyès renewed his

¹*Point du Jour*, I, No. 18.

²*Bulletin de Brest*, I, No. 20. "Comme ce projet d'arrêté pourrait contrarier les privilèges provinciaux de Bretagne, on fera des efforts pour faire dire qu'il n'y a lieu à délibérer sur la motion de M. l'Evêque d'Autun."

³MSS. in the *Archives de Brest*.

⁴Le Roulx, July 15. "Comme les mandats impératifs étaient générale et l'évêque d'Autun n'était pas connu de l'Assemblée, et surtout de nous, nous avions craints qu'il n'interdit que le vote par tête était impératif."

⁵Le Roulx, July 15.

⁶*Point du Jour*, I, No. 18, pp. 133, 134.

⁷See note 2, above.

motion the next day it passed by an overwhelming majority.¹

With this method of disposing of the difficulty the conscientious Pellerin was not satisfied. On July 22, he wrote to his municipality stating that the clauses of his instructions forbidding him to consent definitely to any imposts affecting Bretagne or to surrender any of the rights and privileges of his province were inconsistent with the powers of the assembly to legislate for the whole of France. But, as he also wished the preservation of the provincial privileges, he had prepared a resolution asking the assembly to assure to Bretagne these privileges, by which the effect of the imperative mandate would be removed by removing its object. When, however, he asked the deputies of the province to support this measure, some had answered that he ought to submit to the opinion of the majority of the deputation, and since nearly all were without such instructions they did not see the necessity of any declaration. Others had replied that they had asked of the assembly a new constitution and that, hence, they ought not to seek to preserve their own, of which the entire Third Estate of the province complained. Still others had said that they ought not to speak of the reservation of their rights until the close of the assembly. He, therefore, asked that the electors of his *sénéchaussée* be assembled to send him definite instructions as to the course he should pursue.²

Undoubtedly the events which had intervened in the two weeks since they had been instrumental in defeating Tallyrand's motion contributed much to cause this change from a local to a national sentiment. At the former period, the Revolution was under the cloud preceding the

¹*Point du Jour*, I, No. XIX, p. 140, gives the vote 731 to 28.

²Letter of July 22, published by Bord.

insurrection of Paris, and it behooved the deputies to hold firmly to the rights guaranteed by time and usage.¹ But when Pellerin wrote, this danger had vanished and France was being transformed by the federative spirit which obliterated boundary lines. On the night of the 4th of August, those of the Breton deputies who found themselves bound by instructions to the contrary, announced through Le Chapelier, then president, their conditional consent to the destruction of the privileges of Bretagne, pending the definite decision of their constituents. Only the Breton curés declared that their instructions did not permit them to make such a surrender.²

We have no evidence of any resolution of the Breton

¹On the night of the 4th of August, according to the *Procès-verbal*, Le Chapelier "a exposé les motifs de prudence qui avaient engagé quelques sénéchaussées . . . à lier en partie les mains de leurs mandataires, jusqu'à ce que le jour du bonheur et de la sécurité, succédant, pour toute la France, à des jours d'attente et d'espoir, les autorisât à confondre les droits antiques et révévés de la Bretagne, dans les droits plus solides encore et plus sacrés, que les lumières de l'Assemblée assuraient en ce moment à l'empire Français tout entier." I, No. 40 bis. In his speech on the chamber of vacation of the parliament of Bretagne in January, 1790, Le Chapelier expresses clearly the motives the province then had for no longer insisting upon its privileges. *Bib. Nat.* Lc29/412-29.

²*Procès-verbal*, II, No. 40 bis. As will be seen below in the discussion of the veto, this renunciation by no means destroyed the provincial independence in the minds of the people of Bretagne, for there could still be talk of secession of the province from the rest of France, nor was the question of the imperative mandate here finally set aside. On the contrary, the action of the Breton deputation on the 4th of August was a distinct recognition of the binding character of such mandates in that they announced their inability to renounce the rights of the province definitely. Aside from this, they still recognized themselves as bound by their instructions forbidding them to consent to new taxes before the constitution had been made. The demand of Necker on the 24th of September for a patriotic contribution, therefore, again embarrassed them so that they were fully unable to decide what course to pursue. On that date, Legendre and Moyot wrote: "Aussitôt que nous avons pu prévoir cette difficulté, (prohibition to consent to the tax asked for by Necker) nous nous assemblâmes dans l'un des bureaux après la séance du matin, pour devoir en délibérer en commun et concerter une résolution à transmettre à nos commetans. Plusieurs avis furent proposés sans aucune solution, et le motif de la convocation n'a communiqué qu'un embarras interminé." MSS., *Archives de Brest*.

Club relative to the gathering of troops about Versailles and Paris, but the attitude and fears of the deputies of Bretagne are clearly expressed in their correspondence both before and after the insurrection of Paris.¹ It seemed now as if the Revolution would be forced to abandon its program or to maintain itself by force of arms. To the Breton deputies, the contemplation of such alternatives was not new. The same, in effect, had faced the Third Estate in Bretagne a few months before, according to their belief, with the result that a militia was formed for the protection of the provincial reform movement. In Bretagne, the danger of the use of force against the estates had always been so keenly felt that the liberties of the assembly were deemed menaced if troops were brought within ten leagues of its meeting place.² In the *cahiers* of Rennes, the crisis of July had been foreseen as a possibility, for in article 51 it is declared that "The troops belong to the nation, so that they can not, without rendering themselves guilty of rebellion, favor the violation of the constitution or the national laws, and particularly the encroachment upon the liberties of the assemblies of the States General and of the provinces, in preventing their formation, assembling, or in effecting their dispersion."³

Three prominent members of the Breton Club, Sieyès, Le Chapelier, and Grégoire seconded Mirabeau's motion of July 8 asking the king for the withdrawal of the troops.⁴ Numerous passages in the letters of the deputies show that they would as individuals not have hesitated

¹See the letters of Boullé, June 24, 26, 28, July 7, and of Le Roulx, July 11 and 17.

²*Point du Jour*, I, No. XIX, p. 143. Remarks of Sieyès on the motion of Mirabeau for the withdrawal of the troops.

³*Archives Nationales* B^a26, liasse 170^{bis}.

⁴*Point du Jour*, I, No. XIX, pp. 143, 144.

to persuade the troops to disobey all orders directed against the liberties of the assembly, but that the Breton Club as an organization undertook such a step, as Montjoie declares,¹ there is no evidence to show and is in itself, because of the nature of its organization, extremely improbable, if not entirely impossible.² Boullé in a letter of June 28 expresses his hearty approval of the disobedience of the guards at Paris, and when some members in the assembly wished to have them punished, he accused the latter of the design of discrediting the assembly.³ He even mentions an attempt to bribe some of the troops at Paris by a promise of an addition of two sous a day in their pay.⁴ Le Roulx, in conversation with members of a German regiment at Versailles, learned with evident disappointment that these soldiers felt it their duty to obey should they be commanded to act against the assembly.⁵ Legendre, who must be considered as a moderate member of the Breton deputation, recognized with gratitude the disaffection of the troops during the insurrection of July 13 and 14.⁶

VI

OPPOSITION TO REACTIONARY TENDENCIES—THE BRETON DEPUTIES AND THE NOBILITY—THE "FOURTH OF AUGUST" DECREES

The rising of Paris, the withdrawal of the troops, the recall of Necker, and the apparent surrender of the king to the lead of the National Assembly filled the deputies

¹See extracts in Aulard, I, p. XI.

²See pp. 33-35.

³Letter of July 1. *Revue de la Révolution*, vol. XIV, p. 43.

⁴Ibid., Letter of June 28, pp. 26-31.

⁵Letter of July 17.

⁶Letter of July 15.

of Bretagne with better hopes than they had as yet held. The people were in power; the "Cabal," disheartened, was driven from the councils of the king, with whom, as they believed, they could now proceed to the important work of making a constitution.¹ But the more conservative deputies did not view the general disintegration with the same calmness. Alarmed by the disorders which followed the insurrection of Paris, the assembly began to feel the necessity of repressive measures, or at least of calling the attention of the people to the necessity of the reestablishment of order. Against this tendency the Breton element now directed its efforts. On July 20 Lally-Tollendal proposed an address in which, after stating the situation of the assembly, the dangers of disorders, he invited the people to peace, respect for the laws, confidence in their representatives, and fidelity to their sovereign, and declared that whoever failed in these points should be regarded as a bad citizen. He wished at the same time to authorize the municipalities to organize militia.² This motion the Breton deputies thought too reactionary. Fermon des

¹The deputies of Saint-Brieuc wrote on July 19: "La cabale aristocrate . . . est absolument culbuté. La nation triomphe, et nous sommes actuellement certains de former une constitution qui portera sur des fondements inébranlables. On assure que madame, soeur du roi, et mesdames tantes de Sa Majesté, qui étaient les âmes de ce complot abominable qui a pensé perdre la France, sont parties et retirées dans un couvent. Toute la clique Polignac a quitté la cour, et le roi n'est, quant à présent, entouré que d'honnêtes gens. . . . On pense que les ministres renvoyés ne seront remplacés que sur l'indication qui en sera faite par le Restaurateur de la France." *Société d'Emulation*, XXVI, p. 238.

This same feeling of relief from the previous heavy strain was expressed by Glezen on July 24 in addressing the assembly in behalf of the deputation of Bretagne: "Agités tour-à-tour par l'espoir et la crainte, nous l'eussions attendue (the decision of the assembly on the validity of the deputation) avec plus d'ardeur encore et de sollicitude. Vous n'avez plus, Messieurs, de dangers à courir; votre patriotisme, votre courage les ont dissipés. Vous avez triomphé, par une constance inébranlable, de tous les obstacles qui s'opposaient au bien public. La constitution est censée faite." *Procès-verbal*, II, No. 31.

²*Point du Jour*, I, No. XXVIII, p. 240. *Courrier de Provence*, I, pp. 450, 451.

Chapelnières of Rennes assured the assembly that Bretagne was in the most perfect tranquillity; that there was no necessity for sending a proclamation there, and that the one proposed contained expressions more calculated to cause an uprising of the people than to produce the opposite effect. Glezen, also of Rennes, likewise asked why they should speak of disorders to provinces which enjoyed perfect peace, and how could they censure men who had taken up arms in defense of liberty? Delaville Le Roulx wished the middle class to form a militia, but rejected the rest of the motion of Lally-Tollendal. Robespierre, member of the Breton Club, said: "It (the address) presents in the first place a disposition against those who have defended liberty. But is there anything more legitimate than to rise against a horrible conspiracy for the destruction of the nation? . . . Let us do nothing with precipitation; who has told us that the enemies of the state have tired of intrigue?"¹

Tabled on the 20th, the motion, much softened in expression, was renewed by Lally-Tollendal on the 23d, and sent to the committee of redaction. As finally passed, the provision for a militia was omitted and the assembly, instead of assuming a commanding tone and vigorously condemning the disorders, weakly stated the evil effects of lawlessness.²

At the same time that the deputies of Bretagne showed themselves unwilling to see checked the fury everywhere directed against the Ancient Régime, an opportunity presented itself for reconciliation with the more moderate portion of the Nobility of their province. The electoral assembly of that order had been a stormy one, in which the voices of the moderate members had been drowned

¹*Point du Jour*, I, No. XXVIII, pp. 241-243.

²*Point du Jour*, I, No. XXXII, pp. 275-277, No. XXXIV, pp. 304-306.

by the clamor of the violent. The refusal to elect deputies had been against the advice of a large number and had never been permitted to come to a discussion or even to a formal vote, a noisy manifestation having been taken as the expression of the will of the assembly.¹ There were, therefore, many who regretted that their order was not represented in the National Assembly, and who began in July to make an effort to obtain representation. For once the deputies of Bretagne showed themselves willing to go farther than even the assembly to meet the advances of those who had been their bitterest enemies. On July 24, when the question of the validity of their deputation came before the assembly, Le Chapelier, in answering a question regarding the desirability of inviting the Nobility to elect its deputies, said that in reality both the upper Clergy and the Nobility had exercised the full right conferred by the election regulations in refusing to elect, but in order to open the door to reconciliation the deputies of the Third Estate of Bretagne joined in the invitation in question. The assembly, however, merely declared the right of the Nobility to elect without adding the invitation, which did not satisfy the order.² After some isolated efforts had been made in the province,³ a certain Scott appeared at the Breton Committee during the first week in September and asked in the name of the Nobility that the deputies of Bretagne support in the National Assembly a resolution annulling the oath⁴ of his order and

¹Letter of the Bishop of Rennes, April 18. *Archives Nationales*. BA25. MS.

²*Bulletin de Rennes*, I, No. 36, suppl.

³*Bulletin de Brest*, I, Nos. 30 and 32.

⁴Oath to consent to no change in the constitution of the province, or to participate in any assembly or administration by which the provincial estates were replaced. It was taken in a dramatic scene in the assembly at Rennes the 8th of January preceding. Pocquet, *Les origines de la Révolution en Bretagne*, II, 188-189.

inviting it to elect, by bishoprics, the number of deputies to which it was entitled. But by this time, the sentiments of the Breton deputies had been affected by many rumors and fears of intrigue and counter-revolution in which they suspected their own Nobility to be involved. "The affair of the 26th and 27th,"¹ writes Le Roulx, "the oath, the resumé of facts in which the bourgeois youth were accused of having presented themselves with breastplates,² all these circumstances were recalled as so many injuries for which justice was exacted, and the Breton Committee, judging from what is passing about us by the zeal of the envoy of the Breton Nobility, is not without uneasiness concerning several new projects. They are not able to conceive that the Nobility has not some secret motives, some *arrière pensée*, to devote themselves to the absolute veto, or the system of two chambers." Their answer therefore was that the proposed step was beneath the dignity of the National Assembly which had assigned to the Breton Nobility its place in the hall. Let them occupy it. The Breton deputies would not make opposition.³

An incident which greatly aroused the apprehensions of the deputies of Bretagne was the so-called "Conspiracy of Brest." On July 24 the ministers of marine and foreign affairs informed them that the English were arming in French ports; that they had searched several French vessels and entered into communication with the internal

¹See p. 19.

²This was a charge made in a *mémoire* drawn up by the Clergy and the Nobility after the January riot, and which became accepted as the sense of both the privileged orders. *Bib. Nat.* Lb39/6900. It was a charge which, by its double meaning, particularly incensed the Third Estate.

³Le Roulx. An undated letter (No. 58 in the register) but probably the 4th or 5th of September, since he seems to refer to Mounier's report on the constitution of the legislative body and on the same evening that the address of Rennes on the veto was discussed in the Breton Committee.

enemies of France with the oil of Brest and Lorient.¹ This jectures, with the feeling that in the conspiracy and that per manifestation of a general plo against the Revolution. At th cation, the Breton deputation the ministers, sent a common of Brest exhorting it to assembl gens" and unite with the regu Brest, "to watch the mouth of enemy of the state."² At the sa each deputy should write to hi the "jeunes gens" should hold for immediate service.³

An episode of this nature c feeling of the Breton deputies not yet with safety frighten the upon all that seemed still to sta opposition to the Revolution. resisting repressive measures had pierre on July 20 in the words the enemies of the state have t as if to justify the distrust contained in these words, a conspiracy involving open violence and treason was announced to be charged to "the enemies of state." When, therefore, the committee on reports on August 3, after

¹Letter of the deputies of Saint-Brieuc, July 25. *Société d'Emulation*, XXVI, 242.

²Ibid., and the letters of Legendre and Moyot, August 12, of Le Roulx, July 25 and 26. Also *Archives de la ville de Brest* covering this period, and the collection of documents in the library of Brest, No. 2.334, containing, among other information upon this affair, a manuscript letter of the Breton deputies sent to Brest upon this occasion, signed by twenty-two deputies, nearly all in the same hand.

³Letter of the deputies of Saint-Brieuc, July 25.

revealing the frightful state of anarchy existing in France, proposed a proclamation which in its contents and expressions was distinctly condemnatory of the various disorders,¹ the Breton deputies were no more inclined to acquiesce in this measure than they had been in the resolution of Lally-Tollendal two weeks earlier. But this time they found themselves in the minority, and while the proclamation was in the hands of the committee of redaction they prepared in their club the means of counteracting what they thought the evil effect which would be produced by the proposed action. "At the assembly of yesterday," wrote Corroller du Moustoir, deputy of Hennebont, "it was decided that a proclamation should be made intended to arrest the pillage in the country districts, the burning of villages and castles in the provinces, the proscriptions of the lords and nobles. It was pretended that this was the work of brigands. The commons were persuaded that it was the effect of the desire for liberty. They did not cease to say: this decree had been against their opinion and it was of a nature to inflame rather than to calm. There is a limit to slavery and tyranny; the moment for throwing off both had arrived; we were convinced of these truths. Several very rich *seigneurs* of our assembly, whom we had convinced that, in order that this proclamation might produce its effect, it was necessary that it be preceded, on the part of the privileged orders, by a complete abandonment of their pecuniary exemptions, were prepared to follow us. We awaited the reading of the draft of this proclamation, which was to be made in this session, ready to cause it to fail, if this preliminary were omitted."²

¹*Procès-verbal*, II, No. 40 bis. *Point du Jour*, II, No. LIII, p. 18, No. LIV, 26-28.

²Extract published by Kerviler, *Recherches et notices*, art. *Corroller du Moustoir*.

The renunciations here referred to were those of the evening of August 4. They had been discussed at the Breton Club, the members of which had pledged themselves to support the motion, or motions, in which they were to be proposed to the assembly.¹ It is not certain how far the details had been arranged, but it seems that the leading parts had been assigned before the opening of the session, for the Duke d'Antraigues, who was to move the surrender of the privileges of his province, declared that it was a "comedy prepared in advance."² Aside from the intrinsic importance of the acts of the 4th of August, they are significant as being expressly the result of an unwillingness on the part of the Breton element to allow the assembly to pronounce itself firmly against violence. The proclamation was to be permitted to pass only under cover of an act so far overshadowing it as to cause it to be lost sight of—an attempt to appease rather than to control by law. This maneuver of the Breton Club marks the beginning of the policy—refusal to blame or punish violence once committed—later followed with such fatal effects by its successors, the Jacobins.

¹ *Bulletin de Rennes*, No. 41, foot-note: "Cette motion avait été délibérée au comité de la province de Bretagne, et les députés s'étaient engagés à l'appuyer." This refers to the motion of Noailles. Droz, II, 404, ascribes the initiative to the Duke d'Aiguillon, as also does Alexandre Lameth, *Histoire de l'Assemblée constituante*, I, 96-97; and the deputies of Languedoc wrote on the 4th of August that Noailles had deprived d'Aiguillon of an honor which belonged to the latter by the fact that he had prepared the motion and was to introduce it. Bord; *Correspondance inédite de J. M. Pellerin*, p. 109. On the other hand, we find in a letter of Legendre and Moyot of August 5 the following equivocal passage: "Le Vicomte de Noailles devait remplir le debut et nous étions tous préparés."

² Léon Pignaud, *Un agent secret sous la Révolution et l'Empire, le Comte d'Antraigues*, p. 70.

VII

THE VETO—DISUNION AND WEAKNESS—END OF THE BRETON CLUB

As long as the assembly had stood in danger of a defective organization or overthrow by force, the Breton deputies had won the admiration of a large number of their colleagues by the extraordinary unity of their action and the definiteness with which they expressed themselves. But when the power of the Ancient Régime seemed finally destroyed by the July revolution and the remaining abuses of the feudal system declared abolished by the decrees of the 4th of August, and positive legislation began, disunity became apparent almost at once. With the discussion on the declaration of rights the members of the National Assembly began to separate into parties, a process which did not leave either the Breton Club or the Breton deputation uninfluenced. Mounier had long ceased to be in sympathy with the club. On August 3, Duquesnoy wrote that Le Chapelier was moderate in his views, being in this way distinguished from the rest of the Breton deputies whom he believed very extreme, and that he had been opposed in his election by his colleagues of the province who were jealous of his reputation.¹ But it was the

¹*Journal*, I, 263. Duquesnoy was certainly in error if he supposed that the entire Breton deputation opposed Le Chapelier. Upon his election the deputies of Nantes wrote: "La nomination de M. Le Chapelier à la présidence a causé une véritable satisfaction. Cet avocat breton dont le nom sera célèbre dans l'histoire de notre Révolution, s'est distingué jusqu'à présent par un amour pour la liberté, par une fermeté inébranlable, par une très grande justesse dans les vues, et par une modestie rare encore." Kerviler, *Recherches et notices*, art. *Le Chapelier*.

It does not seem, however, that either the Breton deputation or the Breton Club had taken any preliminary resolution for the election, nor that there was any unity among them during the first ballots, for in that case Sieyès, Glezen, Le Chapelier, all members of the club, would not have permitted their candidatures at the same time, since

discussion over the veto which first brought about a violent division in the deputation. The close union and communication which had existed between the deputies and their constituents had until now been of undoubted value to both parties, but proved in the end disastrous. The reaction following the enthusiasm of the 4th of August greatly disquieted many of the Breton deputies, who felt that the veto might be employed to annul the recent decrees.¹ Under the veto was thus hidden the reaction. Similar fears existed in Bretagne where Rennes on September 2 adopted an address to the assembly which it asked its deputies to present. In this, after the current view that to the nation belongs the legislative, to the king merely the executive power, and that the two must be kept in separate hands, had been expressed, they "declare enemy to the country whoever dares to infringe the legislative power." "They are surprised that anyone dared to submit to deliberation and regard as problematical the question as to whether the decrees of the National Assembly require the royal sanction in order to possess the force of law."² Unfortunately for all concerned, the deputies of Rennes elected to allow themselves to be dictated to by a single city rather than obey their *cahiers*.³ They read

this could only bring defeat to their element as a whole. *Bulletin de Brest*, I, No. 34.

After the resignation of Thouret was known, some of the Breton deputies at least, began to work for the election of Le Chapelier, for Legendre and Moyot wrote on August 5: "Alors nous avons pris les mesures pour élever à la présidence M. Le Chapelier qui n'avait eu que 113 voix au scrutin de samedi. Nous avons parfaitement réussi le lundy." MSS., Archives of Brest.

¹Such fears are expressed by various members of the deputation. See *Extraits d'une lettre d'un député de la sénéchaussée de Rennes*. *Bulletin de Rennes*, II, No. 3. The letters of the deputies of Saint-Brieuc of August 31 and September 1, and the letter of the deputation of Rennes August 31, *Bulletin de Rennes*, II, No. 1.

²Text incorporated in the resolution of Brest published in the *Bulletin de Brest*, I, No. 42.

³Their *cahiers* favored a suspensive veto.

the insulting address to the assembled deputation of the province and asked that it be supported in the National Assembly.¹ When nearly the entire deputation refused, their conduct became such as to greatly wound some of their colleagues. The deputies of Quimper wrote to their municipality: "They (the deputies of Rennes) wish nothing less than to force us to subscribe to their decree, in order to print it, and to prove that they have, and are made to exercise a sovereign empire over the minds of all the Breton deputies; we avow that we have been greatly displeased with the proposition of the Rennois. We have even refused any kind of adhesion to their decree."² The opposition was not so much to the principles advocated as to the insult to the assembly, contained in the declaration that all those who held views on the veto contrary to those expressed in the address were enemies of the country.³ The deputies of Rennes, being denied the opportunity of laying the address before the assembly,⁴ made everyone acquainted with its contents by promptly printing it.⁵ But the deputy of Dinan, whose municipality had adhered to the address, placed upon the bureau a copy of it which was then read, maliciously, Legendre said, to the assembly.⁶ It was greeted with loud murmurs of disapprobation.⁷ Garat, Maury, Foucault at-

¹*Bulletin de Rennes*, II, No. 3. Letter signed by Le Chapellier, Glezen, Lanjuinais, and De Fermon.

²*Journal d'état et du citoyen*, I, No. 7.

³Letter of Legendre and Moyot, No. 51, undated, but its contents show that it was written on the day the assembly discussed the address of Rennes, that is, the 10th of September. MSS., Archives of Brest.

⁴The attempt was made by Glezen on September 5. *Bulletin de Rennes*, Nos. 4 and 5, vol. II. *Procès-verbal*, IV, No. 68, p. 1.

⁵*Bulletin de Rennes*, II, No. 5.

⁶Letter of Legendre and Moyot, No. 51.

⁷*Ibid.*: "Les secrétaires dans la mention qu'ils en ont faite aujourd'hui, ont par méchanceté annoncé que cet arrêté violait sans

tacked it vigorously. Mirabeau declared it absurd, observing that Melun, Geroflay, Corbeil, and Point-du-Jour could circulate like absurdities if the right were granted to Rennes. He added ironically: "The National Assembly has no time to institute itself professor of the municipalities which advance false maxims; it should address itself to the wisdom of the excellent Breton deputies to cause the right principles to circulate in their country."¹ Le Chapelier demanded that Mirabeau be called to order for speaking disrespectfully of the deputies of a province, but his demand was refused. Maury then asked that the address be returned to Rennes with the assembly's expression of disapprobation.² The humiliation of the deputies of Rennes was extreme.³ Le Chapelier, who personally did not approve of the address, undertook its defense, maintaining that the assembly had heard the same principles expressed by no less a personage than Sieyès. The dignity of the assembly was above injury, he said. The substance of the address being alone of consequence, no attention ought to be given to the manner of expression. But the assembly refused to listen to his arguments. Finally the deputy of Dinan expressed his regret at having laid the address upon the bureau and made the humiliating request that he be permitted to withdraw it. In spite of Le Chapelier's objection that the deputy of Dinan did not have the right to withdraw an address once pre-

mesure le respect dû à la dignité et à la liberté de l'assemblée. On en a demandé la lecture, qui a causé la plus grande émotion dans l'assemblée dont le vœu s'est déclaré pour un décret d'improbaton vigoureuse contre l'arrêté dans lequel cependant on avait substitué le mot ennemis au mot traîtres. La flétrissure de cet arrêté, provoquée par une multitude de voix, aurait assurément été décernée, si l'Assemblée n'avait été arrêtée par une considération particulière pour tous les députés de Bretagne."

¹ *Courrier de Provence*, III, p. 10. *Bulletin de Rennes*, II, No. 6, suppl.

² *Point du Jour*, II, No. LXXVI, pp. 342-344.

³ Letter of Legendre and Moyot, No. 51.

sented, the assembly chose this way out of the difficulty.¹

The address, after dividing the deputation itself, had furnished to its enemies in the assembly the occasion for a malicious attack which could not fail to injure its influence at this critical period with those who were still undecided in their attitude. Equally damaging was its effect upon the hitherto ideal relation existing between the deputies and their constituents. Many municipalities adhered to the address,² and since nearly all the deputies were opposed to it, they stood in formal opposition to the municipalities which they had until now recognized, in effect, as their constituents. The complaint of the deputies of Quimper against those of Rennes provoked in the former city a violent attack upon its own representatives, ending in a proposition to approve the conduct of Rennes and disavow all the future acts of their own deputies.³ Legendre and Moyot, when they received the adhesion of Brest, replied in a letter full of indignation, but in which they made many sensible observations recalling to their city its true position and that of the National Assembly. The address, they said, interfered directly with the liberty of debate. The adhesion of Brest had reached them too late to be presented before the vote on the veto had been taken, but even had it arrived in time they would have been too considerate of the honor of their municipality to compromise it in exposing its resolution to the disapprobation of the National Assembly. "Perhaps you will agree, gentlemen, that you have not accorded this consequence (interference with the liberty of debate) all the attention it merits; perhaps you have not remarked

¹Letter of Legendre and Moyot, No. 51. MSS., *Archives de Brest. Bulletin de Rennes*, II; No. 6, suppl.

²See the lists of the cities adhering, in the *Bulletin de Rennes*, II, Nos. 7, 8, 9, 11, and 12.

³*Journal d'état et du citoyen*, I, No. 7.

that it does not pertain to the municipalities of Bretagne to express the views of the *Sénéchaussée*, which have not concurred in the adhesion, and that it pertains still less to their authority to drag after it the suffrages of all the other provinces of the kingdom which respects in silence the freedom of opinion in its representatives. . . .

You have subjected our devotion to a test too severe in charging us with the commission of presenting to the assembly the two decrees of the 2d and 6th (?)¹ of September. We were not able to charge ourselves with that commission without betraying the confidence with which you have honored us, without departing from your intentions which, without doubt, were to concur in the formation of a National Assembly, free, respectable, and respected. It would cease to have these august characters if it were reproached in advance with *daring* to abandon itself to questions hostile to French liberties, and of a nature to degrade the eminent powers confided to it, when it is menaced in advance with the arming against it of the people of whom it is the worthy representative, when, in order to obstruct the liberty of its decrees, it is denounced in advance as the enemy of the country, accused of infamy and treason." In a postscript, they added: "We will not permit ourselves to give advice to the province, but we shall here make a reflection; and we say that if the decree of the 2d is such as it is known, and the adhesions which it has obtained are the general views of all the Bretons, as several of our correspondences say, there remains no other course for Bretagne than to revoke all its deputations, assemble its estates, and there determine the Breton constitution. We will not dare to extend our regards over the future which such a separation would

¹Should be the 7th.

prepare, but it is the frightful perspective offered by the consequences of such a movement."¹

With the address, or about the same time, the municipality of Rennes wrote to its deputies a letter of which we have not the text, but in which it expressed in severe terms its dissatisfaction with its representatives. "It (the deputation of Rennes) has received from the municipality of Rennes the most incredible marks of ingratitude and dissatisfaction," wrote Legendre and Moyot. "M. Le Chapelier, especially, is so abused that if his mission were not so far advanced he would already have sent his resignation, and it is reasonable that his co-deputies would follow his example, for the injustice and calumny are carried to the last extreme."² On September 12, Le Chapelier answered in a letter to the citizens of Rennes in which he outlines clearly and firmly his position on the veto and in which he makes some significant statements regarding his general attitude. The suspensive veto, he said, was not granted out of consideration for the king, but because the nation required some means by which it would be enabled to reverse the decision of its representatives should this be found necessary. He had prepared to defend the suspensive veto in the assembly by a written speech, but before an opportunity of reading it presented itself the address of Rennes had arrived. He did not think that in this a clear distinction was made between the representatives and the represented, but he believed it his duty to defend the principles contained in it, and had therefore done so. He pronounced the opinion of Rennes and voted against the veto of whatever nature it might be; and this despite his *cahiers* which favored a suspensive veto. But

¹Letter of Legendre and Moyot, September 13, MSS., *Archives de Brest*.

²Letter of Legendre and Moyot, September 13.

since opinion had advanced greatly during the last five months, he did not feel himself bound by his *cahiers*, except in so far as they were imperative. The suspensive veto had been adopted, but there was no reason for alarm, for it would harm nothing. Moreover, he hoped that a convention would be called to occupy itself exclusively with the constitution, and it might change this article if it were thought necessary. He closed his letter with a warning significant and prophetic. "But in this moment," he wrote, "permit me to say that quiet is indispensable. The nation can not exist long in the midst of storms. It is not enough to have conquered liberty, it must be preserved; and if an insurrection was necessary to make that conquest, tranquillity, cold reason alone can consolidate it. . . . But consider of what supreme interest it is that the National Assembly should be the rallying point of all the provinces, that the constitution, such as it is, should at least be approved; the people tire of agitation, and after having spent their most courageous energy to repossess themselves of their rights, they will abandon them again if they must defend them too long." His closing sentence shows how deeply he had been wounded by the reproaches of his municipality. "I dare to believe that you will not permit that I be further calumniated in the midst of you, and that whatever be the efforts of my enemies they will never succeed in making the *defense of the popular cause*, to which I have consecrated my existence, *distasteful to me*."¹

Le Chapelier, then, had stood before the assembly in a false light. Instead of still belonging to the radical few still advancing recklessly, he had become alarmed at the

¹ *Lettre adressée à messieurs les citoyens de la ville de Rennes, par M. le Chapelier . . . Versailles, ce 12 Septembre 1789. Bib. Nat. Lb39/7816. The italics are mine.*

uncontrolled movement of the people which he himself had been the first to invite at a time when the Third Estate needed this force to gain possession of power, and instead of continuing the Breton policy of urging vigilance and the expression of opinion in order to influence the assembly, both he and Legendre and Moyot now urged moderation, asking that the assembly be permitted undisturbed to complete its work. How strongly this advice was called for, the facility with which a large number of municipalities of Bretagne had adopted such a violent address as that of Rennes is evidence. But in the deputation itself, the discussion over the veto had brought confusion and caused the deputies to lose their equilibrium so far as to consider the advisability of withdrawing from the assembly in case the absolute veto passed.¹

. In the assembly, the Breton deputies did not reach a compromise upon the veto. When the question came to the vote, the deputies of Rennes, who were probably followed by a number of others, opposed any veto whatsoever, while the rest voted for a suspensive one.² As to its duration, they all voted that it should cease after the first legislature,³ being therefore, upon the whole, de-

¹Le Roux wrote on September 11: "Je n'aurait point quitté l'assemblée, que de concert avec les autres députés de Bretagne. Car nous voulons sincèrement le bien général et n'avons pas comme toute la province, de plus grand intérêt, mais si le vœu de nos commettans eut été éludé par la majorité, qui eut adopté le *veto absolu*, alors, il ne nous restait plus en nous retirant, après avoir encore pris votre avis, qu'à gémir sur le malheur de la patrie." In an undated letter (from its contents probably the 5th or 6th of September) No. 59 in the register, he says: "Cependant je crois qu'il a percé dans l'assemblée que si le veto absolu passait, la Bretagne rappellerait ses députés." Compare with the *Bulletin de Rennes*, II, No. 4, p. 45.

²Letter of Hardy de la Largère, September 21, to the committee at Vitré, *Archives d'Ille et Vilaine*. The letter is in manuscript and unsigned, but clearly from Largère since the writer was mayor of Vitré at a time when that office was held by Largère. "Toute la sénéchaussée fut pour cet avis (the rejection of the veto entirely), les autres Bretons furent divisés, beaucoup se séparent de nous."

³Boullé, September 22.

feated, since the assembly decided to extend it over two legislatures.

It is probable that this period saw the final dissolution of the Breton Club. We have seen that previous to September 18, it had been suspended.¹ Are we not to infer that the disunion among the Breton deputies was the cause of it? Aroused as their feelings were during the first half of September, the friendly comparison of opinions would seem to have been impossible. If such was indeed the motive of the suspension, the dangers to which the popular cause was exposed caused them once more to attempt to rally about themselves those whom they considered the defenders of the right principles, as they had done during previous crises.² Continually they saw themselves in the minority. The popular cause was being deserted by those who should be its defenders, they thought. Rumors of counter-revolution and the attitude of the Clergy and the Nobility in the assembly caused them the greatest uneasiness.³ But this time the cry of rally seems to have failed, for on October 8 their meetings ceased entirely for some time.⁴ The last trace we have of the club is on September 21, and we are not certain even then that the reference is not to the smaller assembly composed exclusively of deputies of Bretagne.⁵ It seems even that the hall they had rented for their meetings was now given up, for on September 23⁶ and October 8⁷ we find the Bre-

¹p. 34.

²Le Roulx, September 18: "Leur salle est de nouveau ouverte à tous les députés quelconques, et ils espèrent sauver, par cette conduite, qui est la même qu'ils ont tenue avant et après le 17 Juin," etc.

³Ibid. Also letter of September 22.

⁴Legendre and Moyot, October 9: "La Chambre de province qui ne tient plus, s'assembla hier dans l'un des bureaux."

⁵Le Roulx, September 22.

⁶Legendre and Moyot, September 24: "Nous assemblâmes hier dans l'un des bureaux."

⁷Note 4, above.

ton Committee assembled in a bureau of the assembly. But whether or not the club did in fact cease to exist toward the close of September, its great rôle as a nucleus in the assembly, giving definiteness and decision to its action, was finished, its last great known act being the too famous decrees of August 4. As a strictly provincial body, the Breton Committee continued to exist probably until the close of the assembly,¹ and from November, 1789, to the middle of March, 1790, was very actively occupied with the division of the province into departments and districts, the continuation of the taxes in Bretagne, and the question of the treatment of the chamber of vacation of the parliament of Bretagne.²

The events of the 5th and 6th of October made a profound impression upon the deputies of Bretagne. If, as Mounier asserts, they had in June wished to transport the National Assembly to Paris to place it under the protection of the people, these events had caused a change in their attitude showing that they had now begun to fear Paris. In the same letter in which Legendre and Moyot despair of the safety of France unless the assembly were freed from the influence of the mob, they announce that in a meeting of the deputies of the province two-thirds had been against the transference of the assembly to Paris, and that a resolution had been introduced to oppose it; "but," they say, "they ended by taking counsel from circumstances and from the necessity of advancing as far as possible the welfare of France."³

¹In a letter of Kervélégan, November 15, 1790, it is represented as asking the "Commissaires de la salle" to assign one of the tribunes to Freron, of the *Orateur du Peuple*. *Archives Nationales*, carton AA.

²For this period, the evidence concerning the Breton Committee is more complete than for the whole preceding period. *Bulletin de Brest*, *Bulletin de Rennes*, but especially the letters of Legendre and Moyot and of Le Roulx.

³Legendre and Moyot, October 9. See also Le Roulx's letter of the same date.

APPENDIX

Following is the list of the deputies of Bretagne as given by F. A. Aulard in *La Société des Jacobins*, I, pp. V-VIII. For detailed information concerning the individual deputies consult Kerviler, *Recherches et notices*.

CLERGY

Bishopric of Dol

Symon, recteur de la Boussac.

Garnier, recteur de Notre-Dame-de-Dol.

Bishopric of Nantes

Moyon, recteur de Saint-André-des-Éaux. (Resigned in August, 1789.)

Chevallier, recteur de Saint-Lumine-de-Coutais. (Resigned as above.)

Maisonneuve, recteur de Saint-Etienne-de-Montluc. (As above.)

Binot, principal du collège d'Ancenis. (Elected September 25, 1789.)

Latyl, oratorien. (Elected at the same date.)

Méchin, recteur de Brains, près Mâhecoul. (As above.)

Bishopric of Quimper

De Lessègues de Rosaven, prieur-recteur de Plogonnec.

Guino, recteur d'Elliant.

Loëdon de Keramon, recteur de Gourin. (Replaced Hervé, at once resigned.)

Bishopric of Rennes

Guillou, recteur de Martigné-Ferchaud. (Resigned August, 1789.)

Vanneau, recteur d'Orgères.

Hunault, recteur de Billé et doyen de Fougères. (Resigned in August.)

Dubourg-Lancelot, recteur de Rétiers. (Elected in September, 1789.)

Querec de Lacoste, recteur de Saint-Jean-de-Rennes. (As above.)

Bishopric of Saint-Brieuc

Ruello, recteur de Loudéac.

Hingant, recteur d'Andel.

Bishopric of Saint-Malo

Rathier, recteur de Broons.

Allain, recteur de Notre-Dame-de-Josselin.

Bishopric of Saint-Paul-de-Léon.

Expilly, recteur de Saint-Martin-de-Morlaix.

Dom Verguet, prieur de l'abbaye royale du Relec.

Bishopric of Tréguier

Lucas, recteur de Minihy-Tréguier.

Delaunay, prémontré de Beauport, prieur de Plouagat.

Bishopric of Vannes

Gabriel, recteur de Questembert.

Guégan, recteur de Pontivy.

Loaisel, recteur de Redon. (Resigned in August, 1789.)

Le Breton, prieur des Bénédictins de Redon. (Replaced Loaisel in September, 1789.)



THIRD ESTATE

Sénéchaussée of Brest

Legendre (Laurents-François), avocat at Brest.

Moyot, merchant at Lanildut.

*Sénéchaussée of Carhaix, Châteaulin, Quimperlé, and
others*

Le Golias de Rosgrave, avocat at Châteaulin.

Billette de Villeroche, merchant and former mayor of
Quimperlé.

Sénéchaussée of Dinan

Coupard, avocat.

Gagon du Chesnay, avocat and mayor of Dinan.

Sénéchaussée of Fougères, Saint-Aubin, and Hédé

Fournier de la Pommeraye, procureur du roi of Séné-
chaussée of Fougères.

Lemoine de la Giraudais, avocat and mayor of Fou-
gères.

Sénéchaussée of Hennebont

Delaville Le Roulx, merchant at Lorient.

Corroller du Moustoir, procureur du roi at Hennebont.

Le Floc'h (Corentin), laborer at Quanquisern-en-
Lignol.

Sénéchaussée of Lesneven

Le Guen de Kerangal, merchant at Landivisiau.

Prudhomme de Keraugon, commissaire of the Estates
of Bretagne.

Sénéchaussée of Morlaix and Lannion

Couppé de Kervennou, Sénéchal of Lannion.

Boudoin de Maisonblanche, avocat at Lannion.

Le Lay de Grantugen, agriculturalist at Plovigneau.

Mazurié de Pennanech, merchant and former mayor of
Morlaix.



Sénéchaussées of Nantes and Guérande

Guinebaud de Saint-Mesme, merchant at Nantes.

Giraud-Duplessis, avocat du roi and procureur-syndic of the community of Nantes.

Baco de la Chapelle, procureur du roi at the présidial of Nantes.

Pellerin, avocat at Nantes. (Resigned August, 1790.)

Chaillou, sénéchal of the vicomté of Saint-Nazaire.

Jary, merchant and director of mines at Nort.

Cottin, secrétaire du roi and seigneur de Saffré.

Blin, physician at Nantes.

Sénéchaussée of Ploërmel

Tnault de la Bouvrie, sénéchal of Ploërmel.

Boullé, avocat at Pontivy.

Robin de Morhery, avocat and agriculturalist at Quillio. (Almost at once resigned.)

Perret de Trégadout, former mayor of Ploërmel.

Le Deist de Botidoux, merchant at Uzel. (Replaced Morhéry.)

Sénéchaussées of Quimper and Concarneau

Le Goazre de Kervélégan, sénéchal of the présidial of Quimper.

Le Déan, Ancien subrécargue of the Company of the Indes.

Le Guillou de Kérincuft, avocat, échevin of Quimper.

Tréhot de Clermont, sénéchal of Pont-Croix. (Replaced Kérincuft, resigned in September, 1789.)

Sénéchaussée of Rennes

Glezen, avocat at the Parliament of Rennes.

Lanjuinais, avocat and professor of law at Rennes.